|
Play poker online at Doyles Poker Room
 |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
|
NO-LIMIT HOLD’EM POKER
by Doyle Brunson
INTRODUCTION
When I decided to create this all-new edition of Super/System, I pondered
how much no-limit hold’em has changed in the past twenty-seven years.
Players are more knowledgeable and aggressive today. And no longer do
you have the luxury of facing half a table full of opponents who don’t
have a clue.
So, I sat down to revise this chapter, to bring it up to modern day standards.
But you know what? I hadn’t read my own advice for fifteen years,
and when I sat down to examine it, I just kept nodding my head in agreement
and muttering, “Damn, that’s good!”
For you, this advice will be as profitable today as when I first wrote
it. For me? Well, I’ve had to adjust my game. Most of my opponents
have read this chapter in the original Super/System, and if I played that
way, I’d be too predictable.
You don’t have to play exactly the way I describe in this chapter.
You’ll probably want to pick your own style and modify these concepts
to fit the games you play. Still, if you incorporate this advice, making
it the soul of your strategy, the rest will fall in place.
I’ve added new thoughts and expanded some of the ideas, but the
core concepts remain as valid and as profitable today as ever. So, here
is my up-to-date advice, blending the previous tips and the tactics that
will always win at no-limit hold’em with some new insights I hope
will earn you extra money. Here’s how to conquer any no-limit hold’em
game in the world.
Ante Up
Now let’s join the introduction from my original no-limit hold’em
chapter. There’s a story I’ve been hearing around poker games
all my life. It’s about a colorful player down in south Texas named
Broomcorn. (Ever since I related this story about Broomcorn in the original
Super/System, people have asked me time and again who was the real Broomcorn.
He is the late Lawrence Herron from Houston.) Whenever someone in the
game is playing real tight, the opposing players needle him by saying,
“Well, you’re gonna go like Broomcorn’s uncle.”
The tight player perks up and responds sharply, “What do you mean,
I’m gonna go like him?” And they say, “Well, he anted
himself to death.”
Whenever you find yourself playing a very tight and defensive style of
poker, you’ll be in danger of anteing yourself to death. As I’ve
always said, the ante determines how fast you play in any poker game.
Since you’ll generally play in a normal or medium ante games, if
you play an aggressive style of poker, you’ll have the best of it.
That’s the way I recommend you play, and it works. This is especially
true in no-limit hold’em, which in my opinion is the Cadillac of
poker games—and not just because it’s my best game. Many of
the world’s best poker players, some of whom are only beginning
to appreciate the great variety of skills you need to be a top-level hold’em
player, agree with me. Although hold’em is similar in some respects
to seven-card stud, there are enough differences to put it in a class
by itself. It’s truly a game that requires very special talents
in order to play it at a world-class level.
Above all else, no-limit hold’em is a game where you have to be
aggressive—and you have to gamble. One of the great things about
hold’em is the infinite variety in the game. There are so many different
combinations of hands and various plays in certain situations that the
game never gets boring. Unlike other forms of poker, you can represent
a lot of different hands in hold’em and put your opponent on one
of several hands as well. It’s a very complex game. You’re
forced to do a lot of guessing, as is your opponent.
Get in There and Gamble
If you want to be a winner—a big winner—at no-limit hold’em,
you can’t play a solid, safe game. My philosophy of play at no-limit
hold’em is a simple one: Try to win big pots and pick up the small
ones (win without a contest). It’s a philosophy that necessitates
a gambling style of play. My style.
Over the years, this style has fostered numerous comments from countless
players about how “lucky” I am. I’ve been hearing that
for years. The simple fact is that it’s not true. Everyone gets
lucky once in a while, but no one is consistently lucky. It takes more
than luck to be a consistently big winner through the years, as I have
done. It is something else. You’ll soon discover what that “something
else” is.
I appear to be a lucky player because every time a big pot comes up, I
usually have the worst hand. There are good reasons for that. I’m
a very aggressive player. I reach out and pick up small pots all the time.
I’m always betting at those pots, hammering at them. And I don’t
want anybody to stop me from doing that. I don’t want anyone to
defeat my style of play.
And if I’ve got any kind of a hand, any kind of a draw, I bet. If
I get raised, I don’t quit. I go ahead and get all my money in the
pot, if it’s a reasonable amount, knowing I probably have the worst
hand and am the underdog to win the pot.
Calling a Post-Oak Bluff
Sometimes I’ll even call a very small bet in a big pot, knowing
my opponent might be trying to pull off a post-oak bluff just to get a
chance at a draw. But if I’m going to gamble like that, my opponent
must have a lot of chips on the table. For example, say I have a 10-9
and, with $10,000 in the pot, the flop comes 8-3-2. With a raggedy flop
like that, my opponent—a tight player, let’s say—might
try to pick up the pot with a post-oak bluff of $1,200. Well that’s
a gutless bet, and I’ll call it trying to catch a jack or a 7, just
so I can get an open-end straight draw on fourth street. Of course, I’m
hoping to catch a 10 or a 9, and I’m in a good position to pick
up the pot on fourth street, whether I improve or not.
The tight player who made that weak bet on the flop is asking me to take
his money. And in most cases, that’s exactly what I’m going
to do when the next card falls—regardless of what it is. I’m
going to make a large bet into that tight player because I feel confident
he’s going to throw his hand away and not put his whole stack in
jeopardy. As you can probably guess, I never make post-oak bluffs.
Aggression
I’ve built a reputation as an extremely aggressive player. And I
don’t ever want to lose that reputation. It’s what enables
me to pick up more than my share of pots.
In most cases, my opponents are afraid to play back at me because they
know I’m liable to set them all-in. So when they don’t have
a real big hand, they let go of the pot, and I pick it up. The accumulation
of all those small pots is a big part of my winning formula. It’s
the bonus I get for playing the way I do, and it’s the secret of
my success.
If I win ten pots where nobody has a big hand, ten pots with let’s
say $3,000 in them, I can afford to take 2 to 1 the worst of it and play
a $30,000 pot. I’ve already got that pot covered thanks to all the
small pots I’ve picked up. And when I play that big pot, it’s
a freeroll.
As I said a little while ago, when a big pot’s played, I’ve
usually got the worst hand. I’d say that when all the money goes
in, I’ve got the worst hand over 50 percent of the time. Obviously,
I wouldn’t be able to overcome that statistic if I didn’t
always pad my stack by picking up all those small pots throughout the
game.
Of course, I’m almost never completely out on a limb in a big pot.
Whenever I make a substantial bet or raise, I’ve usually got an
out. Betting with an out, that’s what I call it. And it’s
the out I have that makes me appear lucky when I’m a dog in a big
pot and wind up winning it.
There are other benefits to playing the aggressive way I recommend. You’ll
be able to break a lot of players because you’re in there gambling
all the time, and because of that, you’ll get a lot of your real
good hands paid off. Tight players don’t get their real good hands
paid off because they rarely make a move, so that whenever they do, their
hand is an open book. And they almost never change gears and start playing
loose.
But you’ll be out there betting, betting, betting, all the time.
Your opponents will see you’re an aggressive player. They’ll
know you’re out there trying to pick up all those pots, so they’ll
sometimes give you a little loose action. And since you won’t always
be out there with the worst hand, you’ll break one or two of them.
After that, they may be scared to get involved with you.
So your style of play will deceive and befuddle your opponents. They won’t
know whether or not you’ve really got a hand. They won’t know
whether you’re going to set them all-in or not. And anytime you
get your opponents in that confused state of mind you’ll have an
advantage over them.
Of course, you won’t play every hand aggressively. Occasionally
you’ll slow down, and sometimes you’ll completely stop and
throw your hand away. You should never start out bluffing at a pot and
keep bluffing at it without an out. For example, whenever I raise the
pot before the flop I’m going to bet after the flop about 90 percent
of the time.
If the flop comes completely ragged, and it doesn’t look like anyone
can have much of it, I’m going to bet at the pot and try to pick
it up even if I don’t have a piece of the flop. If I get called
I’m usually going to give it up—unless I have some kind of
an out—even as little as third pair or an inside straight draw.
Sometimes, you can keep hammering on certain players and drive them off
even when you don’t have an out. But you’re usually better
off when you have some kind of escape hatch.
The reason I occasionally go ahead and put in all my money when I know
I’ve probably got the worst hand deserves repeating, since it’s
so important for you to understand. I do it because I don’t want
somebody playing back at me and trying to stop me from being the aggressor.
If I allow that to happen, it’ll cramp my style. I’ll no longer
be able to pick up all those pots when nobody has a hand. And most of
the time, nobody has anything decent. Somebody’s got to get the
money that’s left out there. I want it to be me.
Small Connecting Cards
An example will best show you what I’m talking about. Let’s
say I raised before the flop with a type of hand that’s one of my
favorites: small connecting cards that are suited. I’m in the pot
with one player who called behind me. At this point, I put him on a couple
of big cards or a medium pair. That’s all right. It’s what
I want him to have. Now, here’s what’ll happen if the following
flop comes up:
With that flop, I’m going to lead right off and bet. If he plays
back at me, I can now be quite sure he’s got two aces or better.
So, I’m about a 9 to 5 dog. The pot odds will compensate a little
bit for that price, but it won’t be laying me enough to put the
rest of my money in. But I don’t want that same guy, who might be
a pretty good player, taking a J-10 and making that same play when I don’t
have anything. To let his play succeed, I have to throw my hand away and
give him the pot. Because I want the pot, I can’t let him succeed.
I want him to fear me. I want him to have the opinion I’m going
to defend the money I put out there. I don’t want him to have any
doubts about that, so I go ahead and put the rest of my money in.
In making that play on the flop, there’s a good chance I can win
the pot right there. Because I’m known to play any reasonable hand—and
some unreasonable hands in a shorthanded high-ante game—I’ve
really made it tough on him. I could’ve flopped a set of trips,
two pair, or even the straight. I’ve put him on the defensive and
he’s got a lot of guessing to do.
It’s not all that bad if he decides to call me because I’ve
got an out. If I make my straight, I’m going to break him. And if
I draw out on him, it will look like I got lucky again. Well, I did and
I didn’t. When I moved in on him, I was gambling to pick up the
pot. When I didn’t succeed because of his call, you might say I
got unlucky. What’s more, I am supposed to make my draws once in
a while. In fact, in that specific situation I’ll draw out more
than one third of the time, by making my straight or backdooring two pair
or trips.
A very interesting thing about that particular 7-6 hand is that I’d
rather have it than a 9-8. The reason is that when you flop a straight
with a 9-8, you’ll frequently find that somebody is on top of you.
For example, when the flop comes Q-J-10, an A-K will have you nutted,
and even a sucker who plays a K-9 will have you beat. I’ve flopped
many a straight with a 9-8, but when a Q-J-10 falls, I’m always
real cautious with the hand. Because people play the higher cards more
frequently than the lower ones, you’re less likely to be in trouble
if you flop a straight with a 7-6 than you would be with a 9-8. I’ll
discuss the general category of small connecting cards in great detail
a little later. As I previously noted, they’re one of my favorite
hands.
Double Belly-Buster Straight
Another of my favorites is a hand where you can flop a two-way inside
or double belly-buster straight. It’s one of the most deceptive
hands there is, and I especially like it in no-limit. It has all the advantages
of an open-end straight, but it’s not as easy to read. Because it’s
so deceptive, I almost always raise with it when I can win a big pot.
For example, say you have a Q-10 and the flop comes
A-J-8. As you can see, it’s very deceptive because you can make
a straight with a 9 or a king. What’s more, if you catch a king
and there’s someone with A-K in the pot with you, you can see all
the trouble he’s in.
Since double belly-busters are such good gambling hands, you might find
the following quick rule of thumb useful: It’s possible to flop
a double belly-buster with any two cards that are part of a straight,
such as 7-6, 8-6, 9-6, and 10-6. Also, two cards with five gaps between
them such as a Q-6 can also flop a double belly-buster draw. In the supplement
at the end of this section you’ll find a complete rundown on all
the hands that have double belly-buster potential.
When you flop a double belly-buster draw, you should make careful note
of which of your possible straights will be the nuts. For example, if
you have a J-9 and the fall is K-10-7, both an 8 and a queen will make
you a straight. However, only the 8 will give you the nuts. If a queen
falls on fourth, someone with an A-J can beat your straight. So you must
be careful—especially in no-limit play—and you must know how
to read the board perfectly in order to recognize what hand is the absolute
nuts. Practice at home until you don’t make a single mistake. You’ll
learn quick enough if you get broke a few times with what you thought
was the nuts but turned out to be only the second best hand.
Look again at the example above. A player with a J-9 could easily think
he had the best straight when the queen fell until someone showed him
an A-J for all his money.
An easy way to determine whether your straight is the nuts is by following
some simple guidelines. You’ll have the nut straight if:
(1) The high-end of the straight is made up with the highest card in
your hand; or
(2) The high-end of the highest possible straight is already on the board.
Drawing to a double belly-buster is one of few situations in no-limit
where you might be drawing to an inside straight that won’t make
the best hand. As I noted earlier, inside straight draws can be real good
plays in no-limit hold’em because for a few chips you have the opportunity
to win a very big pot. But you almost never draw to a single belly-buster
straight that will not be the best hand if you make it. They’re
long-shot plays, so when you do make them, you want to be sure they’re
the nuts.
For example, let’s say you held Q-J and the fall was 9-8-4. Now
you might want to draw at that belly-buster, trying to catch a 10 or make
a big pair (even in limit, but mostly in no-limit). You know if you catch
that 10, you’ll have a cinch hand. But if you held a 6-5, you’d
never draw to it with that flop because there’d be two different
straights that could beat you if you catch a 7, the 6-7-8-9-10 and the
7-8-9-10-J. If a man makes a straight with you, he’s either got
you tied or he’s got you beat. So, you never draw to the dead-end
of a single belly-buster.
Before you decide to draw to a belly-buster, you also want to be reasonably
certain that your opponent is going to gamble with you if you do make
it. I mean, drawing to a belly-buster is a good play, but only if you
can win a big pot by making your long shot. So you want your opponent
to have the best hand possible on the board. If the flop came 9-8-4, as
above, ideally, you want your opponent to have three nines. You don’t
want him to have a pair of kings or A-9. You want him to have at least
eights and nines, or better. You want him to have a very big hand. Your
Q-J would be a very good hand against three nines. It wouldn’t be
as good against a pair of nines because it won’t make enough money.
Your opponent will release a pair far more readily than he’ll release
a set.
So if you can get in real cheap and have the potential to win a big pot,
belly-buster straights are good gambles. But you also have to be very
selective about the belly-busters you do draw to. You don’t want
it to be apparent to your opponent that you could’ve made a straight.
In the illustration just used, you might not get the action you want if
a 10 falls off on fourth street. The Q-J is actually a weak hand when
the flop is 9-8-4. Your opponent might put you on a 7-6 and, when the
10 came, he might be very leery about calling a big bet you made. The
straight possibility might even scare him off completely.
But if a possible straight wasn’t so apparent when the 10 came off,
you could probably win a lot of money. Let’s say you had the Q?
9?, and the flop was J-8-2. You might want to pick the 10 off there because
that would be a very deceptive belly-buster draw. And inside straights
like these are the ones you want to draw for to win a big pot because
they aren’t so obvious.
Bluffs
If you graduate from limit hold’em to no-limit, you might find yourself
doing many things, in addition to drawing to inside straights, that simply
won’t work when all it can cost your opponent is another bet.
A good example of a bluff that has a lot of power to it in no-limit, but
will rarely work at limit, comes when the board is one card off a straight
on fourth street. Let’s say there’s an A-K-Q-J out there and
your opponent bets. You’ve got a 10 in the hole, and since there’s
no flush possible, you’ve got the nuts. Your opponent bets, you
raise, and he plays back. Now, there’s no question he’s also
got a straight.
An unsophisticated player would move in on him right there because he
knows he can’t lose. But what good is that? He’s only going
to get a split.
However, adding some drama and a little acting to your play gives you
a chance to win it all. You know you’re going to call his reraise
but you don’t have to do it instantaneously. Take your time. Just
stall around. Study the board real hard and shake your head several times
making it appear as though you overlooked the possible straight. You could
even pick up your cards slightly and make him think you’re going
to throw them away. Then put them back down and say “Okay, I’ll
call it.”
With all your agonizing, he’s got to give you credit for a set.
You’ve made him think you’re gambling the board will pair
so you’ll make a full. If the board does pair on the end, you bet
him all your money. There’s almost no risk to that play. You represent
a full and many a time your opponent will throw his hand away. Of course,
it’s almost impossible to do in limit because all the guy has to
do is call one bet.
Calling a Bluff
As you can see from the play just described, bluffing often involves a
lot of art. But there’s science to it also. There’s even science
to calling a bluff. The following pot I was involved in will clearly illustrate
what I mean.
In a small ante no-limit game early in my career, I was on the button,
so I limped in with a J-10 in the hole. There were two players in the
pot in front of me. Here’s what the flop looked like:
FLOP
As you see, I had a belly straight draw. Since there was no raise before
the flop, I was reasonably sure neither of my two opponents had very strong
hands. On the flop, the guy in the first seat made a reasonably sized
bet (throughout these discussions, a reasonably sized bet means about
the size of the pot), and the player in front of me called it. Both players
had a lot of money in front of them, so I called as well.
The fourth card was the 2?. They both checked on fourth street, and so
did I. The last card was the 3?. The board now looked like this:
When all the cards were out, the guy in the first seat checked again.
After he bet on the flop and then checked twice on fourth and fifth, I
figured he had the top pair with a bad kicker. I felt the guy in front
of me was drawing at some kind of straight and obviously had missed his
hand. Much to my surprise, he made a real out-of-line bet on the end,
far bigger than the size of the pot.
When he did that, it looked to me like he was clearly trying to steal
the pot. I was also sure I had him high-carded. As I said, I felt sure
he was drawing at a smaller straight than I was.
If I was correct in thinking I had been drawing at the highest possible
straight, I knew I’d win the pot if I just called. I also knew the
other player couldn’t overcall because his hand wasn’t strong
enough.
So I called that out-of-line bet, and my analysis proved correct. The
player with the pair threw his hand away and Johnny Moss, the guy who
over-bet the pot, was drawing to a little straight. So I won the pot with
a jack-high.
I didn’t tell you that poker story because I won the pot with a
jack-high. And you shouldn’t remember it for that reason. It has
a more significant message. I told you I felt neither guy had much of
anything and explained why. Obviously, it was more than just a nebulous
feel. I had played with both those guys often, so I used a certain amount
of reasoning and a process of elimination. And a lot of it was based on
recall of previous hands.
Recall
Whenever I use the word “feel,” you should understand it’s
not some extra-sensory power that I have. It’s just that I recall
something that happened previously. Even though I might not consciously
do it, I can often recall if this same play or something close to it came
up in the past, and what the player did or what somebody else did. So,
many times I get a feeling that he’s bluffing or that I can make
a play and get the pot. But actually my subconscious mind is reasoning
it all out.
You build up a history of every player you ever played with, I mean everyone
that you’ve ever done any serious gambling with. You’ve got
some kind of information on them. It’s there, buried in your mind.
And you don’t have to concentrate to get it out. When the time comes
to use it, you won’t have to force it. It’ll come naturally.
All good poker players have tremendous recall. They reach back into the
depths of their minds and remember what a certain guy did in a similar
situation. A good player might not realize what he’s doing and he
might not know exactly what it is, but he feels when a guy is bluffing
and knows he can make a real big play or make a super call. The vibrations
are definitely there.
And what it actually is, is a sense of recall. If the same situation or
a similar one existed some time ago, a good player knows exactly what
to do in this one. It’s usually a stress situation, when a relatively
large amount of money is involved, that proves a player’s recall
ability.
There’s another kind of feel you can have in a game that doesn’t
depend on recall. This type of feel depends on close observation of what’s
going on during a particular session. You acquire this feel when you notice
that a certain player is really off his game and playing far worse than
normal.
This happens all the time. A lot of players lose control and go on tilt
after they get one or more big hands cracked. They become unglued, lose
their composure. To recoup their losses, they start playing weak hands,
and they play those hands badly—very badly.
It’s easy to capitalize on those situations. Let’s say you’re
in a game with a high-ante structure, (a subject I’ll cover in greater
detail below) and naturally everybody’s playing real fast. You played
a J-9 and the flop came A-9-8. Normally, if you got played with, you’d
be very concerned about that ace and also your kicker. But in this case,
you’re in the pot with a player who’s losing and, from what
you’ve seen, he’s playing very badly. You check on the flop,
and so does he.
All of a sudden, you get a “feel” that all he’s got
is the third pair, a pair of eights. Since he checked, you feel he got
something, a small piece of the flop. He didn’t bet because he wants
to get the hand shown-down. If he had nothing he would’ve bet to
try to steal the pot. And you know he doesn’t have an ace. You know
the worst that can happen is that he could also have a 9 and run you down,
chase you. Well, what you want is for him to run you down with an 8, which
is what you really think he has.
But you feel confident you’re not wrong. If a rag falls off on fourth,
you bet. You know he’s going to call you, almost out of desperation
because he’s losing. So you make some money on fourth and also on
the end. You know he’s not going to show you a hand unless he gets
lucky and pairs his kicker.
The very surprising thing about the previous discussion is that the player
I was referring to as on tilt is actually a very good player. He could
even be world-class. Of course, the
super-stars of the poker world—those who I play against on a regular
basis—are able to exercise far more control than the average player.
Yet even a real good player has moments when he’s playing considerably
off his usual game. So you have to be observant and take advantage of
such opportunities when they present themselves. You’ll have many
more opportunities to do that against the average player simply because
they lose control far more often.
Categorizing Your Opponents
It is also extremely important that you be able to assess the quality
of your opponents’ play. You have to play very differently against
strong players than you do against weaker ones. This is of crucial importance
in no-limit.
Shortly, I’m going to go into considerable detail on this important
subject because I’ve seen very good players fail to adjust their
strategy when they’re in a pot with a certain type of player. In
fact, recently one of the best players I know made such amateurish mistakes
that I wouldn’t have believed it possible if I hadn’t seen
it with my own two eyes. But before I get into the specific details, I
want to give you two general rules to guide you in this matter.
(1) Against a low-grade player: You simply make the obvious play. That
is, you don’t try to get fancy when you’re in a pot with a
weak player. You don’t try to make subtle moves that’ll be
far beyond his capacity to understand or appreciate. In a word, you outplay
him.
(2) Against a higher-grade player (someone who could be thinking along
the same lines as you): You must mix-up your play. Sometimes you make
an obvious play against a strong player—as you always would against
a weak player—and other times you go at it another way and make
a play that’s not so obvious. Most of the time, you have to put
a play on or out-maneuver a strong player.
In a nutshell, that’s all there is to it. And it seems simple and
logical enough. There are even very good players who know that that’s
what they’re supposed to do, but knowing something and being able
to execute it are two different things.
Playing Against a Weak Player
There was a particular player who entered a tournament for the first time
and, almost immediately, it became obvious that he was a weak player.
He was the supreme example of a calling station, a player who’s
next to impossible to bluff.
Even though I had never played against him before, it didn’t take
me very long to recognize the type of player he was. I’ve played
with thousands just like him throughout my career. So I knew what to do
when I was involved in a pot with him. More precisely, I knew what not
to do. I was not going to try to bluff him. Not even once.
I quickly decided that if I was in the pot with him, I was going to show
him a hand. And, if he got lucky enough to beat me, well, he was going
to beat a hand. My mind was made up.
But there were other very good players in this tournament who tried to
run over him, tried to force him out of a pot. They bluffed at him constantly
and were rarely successful. If he had anything at all he looked ‘em
up. As I said, he was the ultimate calling station. He looked enough of
them up to finish far higher than he should have. He was probably about
a 1000 to 1 dog to finish as high as he did. The reason he did was simply
because so many players—and some of them very experienced—just
handed him their money. They literally gave it away to him.
What they should not have done is try to bluff him. It takes an idiot,
in my book, to bluff at a man who you know is going to call you. You simply
can’t bluff a bad player because a bad player will call when he’s
got any kind of a hand and pass when he doesn’t. It’s clear-cut.
You don’t have to be an expert psychologist to figure out what he’s
doing. All you have to know is that if he’s in the pot he’s
got something. And you’re not going to get him out of the pot by
trying to bluff him.
Above all, you don’t want to gamble with that kind of a player.
Forget about that. Show him a hand. You do very fundamental, even obvious
things against a bad player—no tricks, no strategic play, nothing
fancy. Play straightforward poker against a weak player.
For example, if a weak player raised the pot coming in, then checked it
on the flop, and checked again on fourth street, I would automatically
bet, regardless of what I’ve got, because I’d know he doesn’t
have anything at all. It’s simple to outplay him because his actions
tell me whether he’s got something or not. There’s no mystery
about it.
I could also outplay him by adjusting my style to his. For example, I
noted that I’m always stabbing around trying to pick up pots. I
could still do that with a weak player in the pot, but I’d adjust
my play because he’s in there. For instance, I might raise him without
looking at my hand. Now, here comes the flop and he checks. Well, I’m
going to bet at that pot in the dark because I know he probably doesn’t
have anything, and I also know he’s probably going to pass. He checked,
didn’t he? If he had something, he would’ve bet.
Of course, I might have to make a further adjustment. If he checked on
the flop and then called me, I’d give him credit for something.
If there’s no straight or flush draw out there, he’s probably
got a small piece of the board. If he had a big piece he would’ve
bet. If he checks again on fourth and calls me again, then I’d know
I’m going to have to show him a hand on the end.
If I’m in the pot with a weak player and I flop a real big hand,
say a set of trips, I would check it because I know that if he’d
had anything, he would have bet, and I’d be able to break him anyway.
Normally, I don’t slow-play that hand. I always lead with it. But
against a weak player, I wouldn’t mind giving him a free card if
he doesn’t have anything, I want him to improve his hand. I want
him to make something so I can possibly break him.
It’s more difficult to outplay a strong player. You can’t
consistently do simple things against better players; you’ve got
to put a play on somebody who knows what’s obvious. And if I see
him do something that’s obvious, like I think he’s trying
to pick up the pot, I’ll put a play on him and raise him with nothing
because he might throw his hand away.
Since a good player will understand the obvious, I must try to deceive
him. I’ll even put a play on more than one good player. For example,
if someone brought it in or raised it in an early position and three players
just called it, I might make a big raise with nothing, trying to pick
up that pot.
Against a good player, you’ll have a lot more tools to work with
and many different strategies to use. You’re effectively restricted
to a pickax and shovel against a weak player. Never forget that. Don’t
try to devise elaborate strategies to use against a bad player. They won’t
work against him. Use sophisticated plays against a good player. They’ll
work against him.
Another point you should note about weak players is that they come in
several varieties. They’re not all like the one I described above.
Some are the complete opposite. There are some who check good hands and
bet bad hands. They like to bluff, and they do it almost all the time.
So, when you recognize a player like that, you keep on checking it to
him and let him bluff his money off to you.
Note that I didn’t say to check-raise him. You don’t want
to take the play away from that type of player. In fact, years ago, I
rarely used check-raising. In the old days it was a weak play, and I used
it only occasionally. I’d usually do it when someone seemed to be
trying to take the play away from me. Perhaps, I might have checked it
and moved in on him or something like that. But I didn’t do it often.
Now that players are much more aggressive, it is easier to check-raise.
But even today, check-raising isn’t as integral a part of my philosophy
as it is for many other professionals. I do it—you have to keep
people in line—but I usually don’t look for opportunities
to check-raise.
However, I suppose I encounter more check-raising than the average player
because I play so aggressively. If a player makes a hand, he’ll
check it to me thinking that I’m going to bet—and he’s
usually right. Most of the time, I will. So he checks it to me. And after
I bet, he raises.
Surprisingly, if you employ my style of play at no-limit hold’em,
you won’t be in constant fear of getting check-raised. By playing
aggressively, you might think “Well, they’re probably going
to get me this time” every time you bet. Even though you’ll
probably encounter more check-raising than most players, you’ll
be amazed at how many times your opponents keep throwing their hands away
whenever you bet.
It all goes back to my basic style of play. My opponents know that if
I’ve got any kind of a hand, any kind of a draw, and they do check-raise
me, all of my chips—and theirs—are going to the middle. And
because of that, they keep off of me. It stops them from playing back
at me.
Not only does it give me, in most cases, an umbrella of protection against
opponents playing back at me, and not only does it make my opponents fear
me which in turn makes it easy for me to pick up numerous pots without
a contest, but it has other advantages as well. I’ve already told
you I also get a lot of loose action. This may seem contradictory—how
can I pick up pots easily on the one hand and get a lot of loose action
on the other? It’s easy to understand when you realize that I pick
up pots when nobody’s got a hand. And, as I said, that’s a
big percentage of the time. I get this so-called loose action when somebody
does have a hand. At those times, all the money is liable to go to the
center. And when it does—as you now know—I’ve usually
got the worst hand.
But I might also find a hand when I look down. And once in a while, it’s
the best hand. When I’m up against another hand at those times,
the pot gets to be a mountain. It wouldn’t be nearly as big if I
weren’t an aggressive player. I’d never get the action I do
when I’ve got a hand if I were known to slow-play hands or do a
lot of check-raising. That’s why I rarely do those things.
The reason why being known as an aggressive player and constantly playing
that way is the most profitable way to play poker is clearly illustrated
by the following situation.
Let’s say I flopped a big hand—a set of trips or even two
pair. I’m first to act, and I’m in the pot with someone who
raised before the flop. He’s supposed to have a strong hand. He’s
probably got a big pair in the hole, bigger than anything that showed
on the flop.
In this situation, there’s a principle I always apply in hold’em:
always make it a habit to lead into the raiser whenever I flop a big hand.
Most players will slow-play their hand in that spot or hope to get in
a check-raise. When they do that, they’re playing it wrong. By betting
right into the raiser, you make him think you’re either trying to
take the pot away from him or you’ve got some kind of draw or a
mediocre hand. Consequently, he’ll almost invariably raise you.
At that point you can get all your chips in. And it’s tough for
him to get away from his hand because he has so much money already in
the pot. The raiser expects you to check to him on the flop. I mean, he
knows you know he’s supposedly got a strong hand. He raised coming
in, didn’t he?
When most players flop a set with a small pair or two pair with small
connecting cards, they do the obvious. They check, waiting for the raiser
to bet, and then they put in a raise. That’s the wrong way to play
it, because it gives the raiser an opportunity to get away from his hand
at a minimum loss. But if you lead into him, he probably will raise, and
then there’s probably no getting away from it. He’s all but
committed to getting the rest of his money in the pot.
Even if it’s a raggedy flop without a straight or flush draw, you
should still make the same play. Perhaps even more so, because with three
rags out there, a bet would indicate weakness rather than strength to
most players. Since it does look like you’re weak and trying to
take the pot away from him, the average player will respond to your bet
by raising.
The only risk you take when you play the hand this way is that the raiser
might not raise you on the flop because he might not have a hand. However,
he might have bluffed at it if you had checked, and you would have won
the amount he bluffed.
It’s far more probable that he does have a hand. He was the raiser.
He’s represented a hand. He’s supposed to have a hand! Based
upon that very reasonable assumption, I go ahead and lead into his hand.
When compared to check-raising in that situation, it’s the bigger
money-making play, by far. I think it’s one of the strongest plays
in hold’em.
If you flopped a set in an unraised pot and it was a raggedy flop, you’d
have to play the hand quite differently. Depending on what set you flopped,
you might not even play it at all. You’ll see what I mean in a minute.
But the concept you should understand is this: In no-limit play, you must
be very careful you don’t lose all your chips in an unraised pot,
unless you have the nuts at the point you go all-in.
Here’s what I mean: let’s say you and six other players got
in for the absolute minimum, that is, you all limped-in for a $50 force,
the blind bet. Everybody just called. Nobody raised—so the field
wasn’t weeded out at all. Now, a J-4-2 flops. You flop three deuces.
In the previous situation—with this same flop—you should lead
right into the raiser with your set. He’s probably got an overpair
and will raise as expected. But in the present situation, you must play
it carefully. Very carefully. You flopped a hand that’s easy to
get broke with. There’s nothing in the pot, and you don’t
want to get broke in a nothing pot.
The six people in the pot with you tried to flop the nuts for free. And
one of them might have the nuts, or close to it. So if one of the players
commits all his money when there’s only a few hundred dollars in
the pot, you better watch out. Your three deuces probably aren’t
any good.
You could be up against three jacks, but that’s not as likely as
three fours, since there was no raise before the flop. That’s the
hand you should be afraid of.
I’m not saying you shouldn’t play the hand. I’m just
saying that you have to play it carefully. Since nobody showed any early
strength, you’re not likely to be up against a big pair, but you
could be facing another set. Nevertheless, if it’s checked to you,
you’ve got to bet it.
But you don’t want to get broke with the hand because it was a nothing
pot to begin with. If you get raised, your own judgment in the particular
situation will have to prevail. With the third set, deuces, you might
want to go on with the hand, but then you might not. With the second set,
fours, you can’t get away from it. Someone’s going to have
to show you three jacks. That’s all there is to it.
Courage
An important point for you to remember is that in a judgment situation
you’re always better off sticking to your first impression. With
constant observation of your opponents’ play, you’ll learn
how to put them on a probable hand. Once you decide what a man’s
most likely to have—especially in no-limit—you should never
change your mind. You’ll probably be right the first time, so don’t
try to second-guess yourself. Have the courage and conviction to trust
your instincts!
Having courage is one of the most important qualities of a good no-limit
player. If you don’t have it, you’ll have to restrict your
play to limit poker. You need courage in limit too, but not nearly as
much as in no-limit.
Limit vs. No-Limit
A lot of limit players—and I’m talking about the very best
limit players now—just can’t play no-limit. They don’t
have the heart for it. What’s more, they can’t adjust to the
complexity of no-limit play, and they find it very hard to go from limit
which is essentially a mechanical game, to no-limit, one that takes into
account everything. Only very special players can make that transition
successfully.
You also have to have a different feel for no-limit play. I mean, you
have to be right just about all the time, especially when your entire
stack’s at stake.
In limit play, you’re not going to get knocked out of a game by
one or two mistakes. You can make several mistakes in a limit game and
still win the money if your opponents are making more mistakes than you
are. With no-limit, make just one crucial mistake at any time and you
can lose all your chips.
Muscle
It not only takes a lot of heart to play no-limit, it also takes a lot
of muscle. You need muscle in limit too, but you need much more of it
at no-limit. A strong no-limit player can keep slapping you around, just
lean on you and keep leaning on you until you topple. Of course, that
could happen in limit too, but again, not to the same degree.
The very best players I know are extremely aggressive players and that’s
what makes them great players. The more aggressive they are, the better
they are. It’s that simple. And I firmly believe that’s what
accounts for the difference between a very good player and a truly top
player. It’s the dividing line.
There’s not a man alive that can keep leaning on me. I refuse to
let somebody keep taking my money, and all the other truly top players
are the same way. An aggressive player might do it for a while. But at
the first opportunity I get, I’m going to take a stand and put all
my money in the pot.
It’s like that little boy who keeps sticking his head up and keeps
getting slapped all the time. Well, sooner or later he’s not going
to stick his head up any more. So if a guy keeps going on and on and keeps
pounding on me, then me and him are fixing to play a pot.
Like me, all the top players know you have to be extremely aggressive
to be a consistent winner. You have to bet, bet, bet, all the time. If
I find somebody I can keep betting at and he keeps saying “Take
it Doyle,” “Take it Doyle,” well, I’m going to
keep pounding on him. I’m not going to let up. And that poor guy
never will win a pot from me. He’ll have to have the nuts or the
nerve to call me.
That’s what most players do. They keep throwing their hand away.
They’re weak. They sit down and try to make the nuts on you. That’s
hard to do. So you keep whamming on ‘em and whamming on ‘em
and you just wear ‘em down. And sooner or later, you’ll win
all their money.
Perhaps now, you can see more clearly what I explained earlier. When a
big pot comes up, I’ve usually got the worst hand. That weak player
finally picks up the nuts and that’s what I usually look at in a
big pot. But I’ve already paid for that big pot with all the smaller
pots I’ve won, so I’m freerolling with all that weak player’s
money and the money of all the others like him.
You can’t do that against a truly top-player in no-limit because
he’s fixing to make a stand and play back at you. And that’s
the big difference between a merely good player and a great one.
Another important difference is that a real top player can win money with
a marginal hand. A weaker player can’t do that. Either they don’t
know how, or they’re afraid to put any money in the pot in a borderline
situation. They want the nuts or close to it before they’ll jeopardize
any of their chips. They don’t want to do too much gambling, so
they check a lot of hands that I’d bet for value.
Betting for Value
Betting for value is what it’s all about. For example, if it came
down to a tough situation on the end and a tight player had two pair but
there’s a possible straight out there, well, that tight player would
probably check it trying to show the hands down. In that same situation,
as long as I felt reasonably sure my opponent didn’t have that straight,
I’d be more aggressive. I want to make some money on the end. I
want to get value for my two pair. So I’d bet and try to sell my
hand for the most money I thought I could get. I never was a tight player,
even when I first started to play. Experience has taught me a lot. Early
in my career, I didn’t know how to start at a pot and quit, like
I do now.
I don’t have to have the nuts to bet my hand on the end. If I feel
like I’ve got the best hand, I’m going to bet it and get value
for it. A more conservative player would check it on the end, and he’ll
get his check called. So he’ll lose that last bet.
A very big part of winning consistently and winning big at no-limit is
getting the other guy in a position where if he makes a bet he’s
actually jeopardizing all his chips as opposed to you jeopardizing all
of yours. That has always been the key to no-limit play as far as I’m
concerned. I want to force my opponent into a decision with all his chips
on the line.
For example, if a guy’s got $20,000 in chips and you lead off for
$6,000 or $7,000, you’re really betting him $20,000. He knows that
if he calls that six or seven, well then, he’s got to go for the
rest of it. You’re betting $7,000; he’s betting $20,000.
On the other hand, if he bets me $7,000, the reverse is true. So, I always
try to make the bet that puts him in jeopardy, not me. If he’s right
and I’m bluffing, he’s going to move in with his $20,000,
and I’m not going to call him. So he’ll win $7,000. But if
he’s wrong and I’ve got a hand, he’s still going to
move in, but now he’s going to get called. And he’s going
to lose $20,000. So he’s laying me about 3 to l, his $20,000 to
my $7,000. I put the commitment on him. I make him commit himself. I’m
not committed no matter what he thinks. That’s the beauty of it.
He’s thinking about my bet and wondering how much more he’s
going to have to put in there.
It’s an either/or situation. Either I’m bluffing, or I’ve
got the nuts. And against me, he knows it could cost him $20,000—his
whole stack—unless he throws his hand away.
And you’d be surprised how many times they say “Take it Doyle,”
“Take it Doyle.” They just throw their hands away over and
over and over again. I mean, even I’m surprised. I think to myself,
“Well, he can’t throw this one away.” But I bet anyway.
And there goes his hand—chunk! It finally gets to be mechanical
with them. And I’ve won another pot.
I’ve stolen so many pots I can’t begin to count them. And
most of the time, I’ve actually had to force myself to bet. I’d
be playing all night without one decent hand. Yet I’d win every
pot because I didn’t bet into the nuts. It goes on and on like that.
I pick up a hand, and I’ve got nothing. The flop comes out there,
and I’ve still got nothing. So I kind of have to hit myself to bet
at it, because there’s a guy I’ve been pounding on and pounding
on. And all the time, I’m thinking, “How can he throw his
hand away this time?” But I bet and away it goes. Chunk! One more
time.
If he takes a stand and raises me, I go back to my basic philosophy. If
I’ve got a hand, I’ll go with it, even though I know it might
be the worst hand.
By now, you should have a very good idea of how I play no-limit hold’em.
I hope this somewhat lengthy introduction gave you a sufficient feel for
my style of play, and I hope it will help you to understand how I play
specific hands in various situations. I’ll discuss those shortly.
However, when you read those discussions you should realize it’s
quite difficult to state exactly what I’d do with a specific hand
in a particular situation. So many things are involved. No-limit hold’em
is a very complex game.
Most of the things I say are an accurate reflection of what I’d
generally do. But I might do something else or even the completely opposite
depending on who’s in the pot with me and whether or not I have
position on him.
Always remember, no-limit hold’em is a game of position and people.
There’ll be a lot of times when only your good judgment will dictate
the proper play. Often situations come up where a hard-and-fast rule will
prove inadequate. Poker, especially no-limit hold’em, is not a game
you can learn to play well in ten easy lessons. A thousand hard lessons
might not be enough. There are simply too many variables involved.
Nevertheless, the lessons you’ll learn below will go a long way
in helping you to master no-limit hold’em. The general principles
and concepts that I discuss will give you a far greater command of the
game than almost all the players you could expect to be competing with.
I wish I’d known all the general guidelines below when I first started
to play. It would’ve made things a lot easier for me. That’s
for sure.
But before I get into how you should generally play specific hands, there
should be a discussion of the ante, betting structure, bankroll requirements,
and other considerations you’ll have to take into account before
you sit in on a no-limit hold’em game. So that’s what I’ll
do now.
The Ante and Other Considerations
If I had to choose a particular size game that would be close to perfect
for no-limit hold’em, it would be eight-handed, also known as a
ring or full game. Of course, I prefer to play in a shorthanded game with
about four or five players, because in a shorthanded game with a high
ante, you’re forced to get in there and play. You can’t just
sit there and wait for the big pair, A-K, or even small connecting cards.
If you do, you’ll go like Broomcorn’s uncle. So a game like
that suits my style just fine. It gives me plenty of room to muscle the
game.
A full game with eight players is all right too. That’s just about
the right amount of players for a ring game where there’ll be good
action. I mean, there’ll be people coming in the pots because they’ll
know they won’t have to be looking at the nuts every hand.
However, when that eight-handed game all of a sudden turns into a ten-
or eleven-handed game, well, the complexion of the game changes completely.
What was once a relatively fast and loose game becomes a thing of the
past. The players no longer get in there and play as often. The game begins
to screw down real tight.
With eleven players, there are a lot more combinations out there on every
hand than with nine players. So everyone stops playing borderline hands
and starts waiting for the really good ones. In short, they don’t
do as much gambling, and the action really dries up.
Loosening Up a Game
Many poker games are like that, and they stay that way unless something
happens to change the character of the game. More than anything else,
the something that changes a tight game back into a loose game happens
when one of the players starts giving a lot of action. As I’ve said,
that’s what I do. I’m known as an action player. It’s
an image I’ve always had. Because I give action, I get it.
I’ll get into a poker game and almost from the very first hand I’ll
start gambling. I’ll be taking chances—betting, raising, reraising,
moving in. That’ll stir up a game real fast. One player can do it.
That’s all it takes. And that player’s usually me.
I don’t merely talk loose, I prove I’m loose by my actions.
You know the old cliché: “A first impression is a lasting
impression.” Well that first impression I create lasts throughout
the session, even though I might change gears, say go from loose to tight
to loose, several times during the course of a game.
Adjusting Your Speed
Being able to adjust your playing speed is a very important part of being
a top player. There are a lot of reasons for this.
(1) You never want to get yourself stuck in an identifiable pattern.
You must mix up your play. If you do, you’ll always keep your opponents
guessing.
(2) You want to create an image, the image of a loose, gambling-type of
player who gives a lot of action. But it has to be the image of a good
loose player, not the image of a fool who’s throwing a party, giving
his money away.
(3) Since you’ll most likely get off loser if you play as I recommend
and start plunging around (playing very loose) almost as soon as you begin
to play, you’ll have to gear down and start playing tight after
you’ve laid the groundwork for your image. Then you’ll start
playing loose again, and you’ll continue to vary your speed throughout
the session.
(4) You’ll also want to adjust your speed to the varying speeds
of particular players. If there’s a guy in the game who’s
speeding around, do exactly the opposite by gearing down and remember
to play only solid hands against him. On the other hand, if you notice
that a certain player is playing real tight, you can start bluffing at
him.
(5) The game itself might dictate the speed at which you’ll have
to play. If everyone is playing real loose and all the pots are being
jammed, start playing real tight. Conversely, when the game is so tight
you can hear it squeaking, you should play loose and pick up all the pots
you can.
(6) When players start dropping out of the game and their seats remain
vacant, you have to move into high gear. As I said, you can’t sit
back and wait in a shorthanded game. If you do, the ante will get you
because the good hands don’t come often enough. So you must play,
or you might as well quit the game.
(7) And of course, there’s the ante. That’s the main thing
that determines how fast you play. Actually, the absolute size of the
ante is not what’s important. It’s the relationship of the
ante to the amount of money you have. A $10 ante in a no-limit game would
be quite high if all you had was $500. But if you had $5,000, that $10
ante would be very low. In the high-ante game, you’d have to play
pretty fast. You could slow down considerably in the low-ante game.
The ante and blinds is such an important factor in determining how fast
you play, that the trouble and trash hands I later discuss would become
big hands if you were anteing high enough. In fact, in the old days, that
was the case in the World Championship Hold’em Tournament because
of the way it was structured. It started with each player anteing $10,
and there was a $50 blind. As the tournament progressed and players were
eliminated, the ante and blind got higher and higher according to a predetermined
time schedule until it was down to the final two players. At that point,
each player anted $1,000 and blinded it for $2,000. If you sat around
and waited putting that kind of money in every pot, you’d go faster
than Broomcorn’s uncle.
Today’s tournaments are structured to be a lot faster than that.
You’ve got to play almost every hand when you’re anteing that
high. At the very least, you’ve got to see the flop. So, it’s
really not all that surprising I won the 1976 and 1977 World Championships
with trash hands. The only thing surprising about this is that the hands
were almost identical both years.
In 1976, when I won $220,000, the last pot had $176,000 in it. I won that
pot with the 10? 2?. All it had on the flop was a pair of deuces, but
I caught two running tens on fourth and fifth. Jesse Alto, a very experienced
non-professional who owned an automobile dealership in Houston, Texas,
was the man who came in second.
In 1977, the late Bones Berland was the young man who came in second to
me. In the last pot with Bones, I had a
10? 2™ and flopped a pair of tens. This time, I caught a 2 on fourth
street—but I filled up with a 10 on the end. That last pot was worth
$130,000 and I won $340,000 in the 1977 tournament.
Of course, in a normal ante ring game, I’d rarely play those hands.
There’s little reason to when the ante doesn’t force you to
play. A major exception is when I play a pot for the sole reason of trying
to steal it. Then, it doesn’t make any difference what I have. I
mean, I could be playing the hand without even looking at my holecards.
At such a time, I’d be playing my money, my position, and a particular
player. My hand wouldn’t matter. If I was forced to look at it because
I got played with, I might find two aces, A-K, or trash.
People have criticized me for losing $580,000 with the Q-8 offsuit in
the $25,000 buy-in final event at the Bellagio in 2003. Well, I’ve
just explained to you how that happened. I was playing my money, my position,
and a particular player—and my hand could have been anything. I
hadn’t made a pair the whole day, and I’d had to stay alive
by stealing some pots, but on this particular play, my read was wrong.
You’ll almost surely have to get some no-limit experience under
your belt before you’ll be able to play a pot completely blind.
So, in the beginning, I suggest that you restrict the way you play specific
hands to the recommendations I make below. However, it’s important
for you to understand that those recommendations are what I would do in
a normal or medium ante ring game. In different games you’ll have
to adjust your play as previously discussed.
In order to help you determine what constitutes a normal medium-ante game,
you should use the following table as a guide.
Nine-Handed Game - Blinds Chart
Ante
Size $
Ante Single Blind Multiple Blinds Buy-In*
1st seat 2nd seat
Very Low $1-$5 $5-$10 $5-$10 $10-$20 $1,000
Low $5-$10 $25 $25 $50 $2,000
Medium $10-$20 $50 $50 $100 $5,000
High $25-$50 $100 $100 $200 $10,000
Very High $50-$100 $500 $300 $500 $25,000
*Twice the minimum buy-ins listed here would be much better. More than
twice would be better still.
You wouldn’t want to sit down with less than the minimum buys shown.
As the footnote states, you should definitely consider buying-in for more.
Today, when I play in a game with two blinds of $300 and $500, I never
sit down with less than $100,000. What’s more, I like to have as
much or more money than any other player at the table. If my stacks are
not approximately equal to the guy with the most money, then I couldn’t
break him, could I?
And I practice what I preach. I start playing fast right away. I’ve
always played like that, even when I was just starting out. Back then
I’d buy in for a thousand in a small no-limit game, and I’d
usually get stuck that first thousand. Then, I’d pull up and start
playing tighter, and I almost always got even or won.
About three out of four plays, I’d lose that first thousand, but
on that fourth play, I’d get on a winning streak or a rush, and
I’d more than make up for those first three losses. I mean, I’d
be playing so fast and winning so many hands when I was rushing that I’d
literally break every player in the game. Because as you know, whenever
I hold a bunch of hands, I usually get action on them.
I’ve never won a bunch of pots watching the other guys play. If
I’m making a bunch of hands or striking, I’m in there—I’m
not on the sidelines. If you’re going to have a rush, you’ve
got to let yourself have one. You’ve got to sustain that rush. And
to do that, you’ve got to get in there and play.
It used to be that after I had won a pot in no-limit I would be in the
next pot, regardless of what two cards I picked up. And if I won that
one, I’d always be in the next one. I’d keep playing every
pot until I lost one. And in all those pots, I’d gamble more than
I normally would. Nowadays, I still to try to observe this, but I’ve
modified it because players are so much more aggressive.
If you don’t play that way, you’ll never have much of a rush.
I know that scientists don’t believe in rushes, but sometimes rushes
can make you a fortune. There’s only one world-class poker player
that I know of who doesn’t believe in rushes. Well, he’s wrong,
and so are the scientists. Besides, how many of them can play poker anyway?
I’ve played poker for more than fifty years now, and I’ve
made millions at it. A big part of my winnings came from playing my rushes.
If you want to take the money off, I mean, make a big score, then you’ve
got to play your rushes. It’s that simple. Not that there’s
anything supernatural about rushes, it’s how your opponents perceive
you when you’re on one that’s important. They are flat-out
less dangerous. They pay you off more and challenge you less, and that
translates into pure profit.
At this point, you should have a very good feel for my style of play.
It should help you to understand and appreciate the things I’m going
to say about the way I play specific hands, from before the flop on through
each stage of play until all the cards are out.
In all the situations that I’ll discuss below, an important assumption
has been made: Unless otherwise noted, the way I’d play a specific
hand at no-limit hold’em is how I’d play it in a pot against
other top poker players and not the way I’d play it against a weak
player.
The reason that assumption has been made is because, as you already know,
against a weak player or a drunk you have to play quite differently. All
you try to do against a weak player is make the best hand and then extract
from him the largest amount of money you can. Just outplay him.
HOW TO PLAY SPECIFIC HANDS
Remember, the recommendations I make below are how you generally should
play the hands discussed. That’s the way I usually play them. But
you should never fall into a pattern playing poker. I don’t. I always
vary my play. I try to mix it up as much as I can. I never consistently
repeat my action on any hand. I don’t play like a computer that’s
programmed to do the same routine over and over again. The high quality
players I play against on a regular basis would easily detect a pattern
to my play if there were any. So I never do the same thing with the same
hand from the same position against the same player. I’m always
changing speeds during the course of a game.
However, for your purposes, my playing recommendations for a particular
hand are a good way for you to play them until your opponents learn your
style. When they do, you start shifting gears, up and down continuously,
until there is no noticeable pattern.
I’m going to break the game down into four major and very broad
categories as follows:
I. Pairs
II. Small Connecting Cards
III. Borderline Hands
IV. Trash Hands
How to play your hand when you have a pair in the pocket is going to
be discussed first. That category will be sub-divided and discussed as
follows:
a. Big Pairs and Big Slick: A-A, K-K, and A-K
b. Q-Q
c. J-J down to 2-2
I’ve grouped an A-K with a pair of aces and a pair of kings because
it’s a very strong hand. As you’ll learn, I would rather have
A-K than A-A or K-K. I’ll discuss each of the hands as I would play
them in a nine-handed game from an early position (first three seats),
middle position (next three seats), and late position (last three seats).
A medium-ante game is assumed, unless otherwise noted.
A-A and K-K
Pre-Flop Play
Early Position. With a pair of aces or kings in an early position before
the flop, I would probably just call the blind or limp in, hoping that
somebody raises it behind me so I can reraise.
Middle Position. In a middle position, if nobody in the early seats came
in, I would play them the same way. But if somebody in the early seats
did come in, I’d put in a raise of about the size of the pot.
Late Position. In a late position, I’d obviously raise with them
and hope that somebody trailed his hand around to me, that is, slow-played
his hand in order to reraise me. If he did, I’d play back of course,
and I might move in depending on the circumstances. If I did play back
with two aces or two kings and got about half my money in the pot before
the flop, there’s no question that I’d get the rest of it
in on the flop, regardless of what came. Nothing could stop me. If my
opponent didn’t set me in on the flop I’d move it all-in myself,
because there are too many ways I could outguess myself, and I’m
not going to try. If I get either of those big pairs cracked, well, I’m
just going to have to lose my money.
Conversely, a rare situation could exist where you’d consider throwing
away two kings before the flop if you got raised. It’s a hard hand
to get away from, but if a real tight player, one so tight that he probably
wouldn’t make that kind of play unless he had two aces, moved in
on you, then you might want to throw them away. Of course, you’d
have to be almost certain about your man before you do that. One way I
make this rare decision is to put myself in my opponent’s position.
I ask myself, “If I were him, would I reraise with two queens or
less?” If the answer is no, I throw the two kings away.
I’m going to discuss how to play a big pair on the flop in a moment.
But this is a good place to note that when you have two kings and there’s
a single ace on the flop, it’s a complete judgment call as to whether
or not you should go on with your hand. If you put your opponent on an
ace, that’s the end of the pot right there. If not, you play your
two kings as if you had the best hand. Here are two particularly relevant
hold’em probabilities:
(1) In a nine-handed game, when you have two kings, the probability that
no other player has an ace is about 20 percent. Put another way, a player
will have an ace about 80 percent of the time.
(2) If a player is holding two unpaired cards lower than kings, an ace
will flop about 18 percent of the time.
The Flop
Regardless of your hand, the flop is where you’ll make your most
crucial decisions. It’s the key point in the hand. It’s where
you put people on hands, decide what they’ve probably got. Usually,
everything after the flop is more or less cut-and-dried.
Playing with No Help on the Flop. Of course, you put people on hands
before the flop too, but on the flop, you’re in a much better position
to determine what a man probably has by the way he calls, whether he’s
drawing to a straight or flush and so forth. I play a pair of aces or
kings very cautiously from an early position when there are three cards
that’ll make a straight or a flush on the flop. This is especially
true if there are two or more people in the pot with me. The guys that
called behind me are liable to have anything. In that position, they’ve
either got a hand that could break me or I’ll win a very small pot
if I bet. So in an early position, a bell rings reminding me not to bet
when I see three to a straight or flush on the flop and I’ve got
aces or king in the pocket. Consequently, I immediately start playing
that hand slow, and usually I just check in a front position.
If I’m in a late seat and somebody in the early seats had trailed
in, I might go ahead and bet once. If I got called, I would immediately
become defensive again with that hand. Anytime there are three cards to
a straight or flush, I play the hand with extreme caution.
The quality of the possible straight that’s out there also has a
big influence on the way I’d play that big pair. If it came
9-8-7, 10-9-8, or J-10-9 and I’ve got two people in the pot with
me, I immediately give it up. Almost any two cards that those two players
have will fit into those flops somehow. They’re either going to
have a hand that’s already got me beat or they’ll be drawing
to a hand that would make my hand no better than an even money shot.
If the flop comes 10-9-8 and one of your opponents has a Q-J, he’s
got the straight made. If he’s got a J-10, he’s got a pair
with an open-end straight draw. He could catch a 7, 10, jack, or queen.
There are thirteen cards in the deck that will beat me, namely four sevens,
four queens, three jacks, and two tens, and he’s got two shots at
them. That makes his hand as good as mine at this point. In fact, he’s
almost exactly even-money to beat me, so I don’t want to put myself
in a position where I could get broke. I don’t always give up the
pot in that situation. I just play extremely cautiously. I don’t
just charge in and try to win the pot right there.
If just a J-10 falls, say the flop is a J-10-2, well, there I’d
really play my two aces fast, because any combination of big cards would
give my opponent some kind of hand. For example, a
K-Q will give him an open-end straight draw; an A-K will give him two
overcards and a belly-straight draw; and an A-J, K-J, Q-J, A-10, Q-10,
or K-10 will give him a pair. So I’d go ahead and play my two aces
in that situation. If he’s got jacks and tens or better, well, more
power to him. If you know your player, you’ll be able to figure
out what hand he’s likely to have. You have to be logical in putting
your opponent on a hand.
I’m not as leery of a three-card flush on the flop as I am of a
three-card straight. With a three-card flush, there aren’t as many
possible hands that could beat me—although it’s possible that
your opponent has a pair and a flush draw if he’s in there with
you.
The first thing I’d do would be to see if either one of my two aces
or kings matched the cards out there. If three hearts fell and I had two
red aces, I would immediately play that hand. It’s a big hand. But
if I had the two black aces, or another hand without the A?, I might be
a little more hesitant to play it.
But if I did have the A?, I’d play the hand fast on the flop. If
I get called, I’m in a position to win it anyway. I know where the
nuts are. That’s one of the most important things about no-limit
hold’em. If you can avoid it, you never want to get your money in
dead.
For example, you don’t want to be drawing for a flush when there’s
a pair on the board. Your opponent could have a full house. And you don’t
want to be drawing to a straight when another man could have a flush.
If the board comes three hearts and you’ve got an open-end straight
draw, you don’t draw at that straight. You throw your hand away.
All the top players try to keep from ever getting their money in completely
dead.
If a pair and a rag flop and I had a pair of aces or kings in the pocket,
I’d bet at that pot from an early position. If I got called, I’d
proceed cautiously. I mean, when the next card was turned, I’d check
it to him. If he bet, maybe I’d call it or maybe I wouldn’t.
It would depend on what I felt that he had. I’d know he’s
got something that he likes.
For example, if the flop is 6-6-2 and I bet and he calls, he’s telling
me he’s got some kind of hand. He’s probably got a pair in
the pocket, anywhere from sevens to tens, or else he’s got three
sixes or three deuces. So I’d use my judgment at that point, and
I’d be cautious again.
If there were a couple of players in the pot in front of me and one of
them flopped a set of sixes, he’d probably check it to me. That’s
what most players do in this situation, check a set into the raiser. But
as you know, that’s the wrong way to play it. A strong player would
know that the right thing to do is lead into you.
If it was checked to me and there wasn’t a straight draw on the
board—say the flop was 7-7-2—I might check it as well and
give a free card. I’d do that for two reasons:
(1) If he didn’t have a hand, I’d want him to help his hand
enough to continue playing. For example, if a jack or queen fell off on
fourth street, it might pair him.
(2) I’d want to eliminate the possibility that I’d get broke
if he does have a 7.
But if the flop was 6-6-2, I would bet because I wouldn’t want
a 3, 4, or 5 falling off and making somebody a straight. In brief, you
don’t give free cards if that free card could break you. If there’s
a possible straight or flush draw on board, you don’t give a free
card.
If I had two aces with a 6-6-K flop and it was checked to me, I’d
probably check it back. If he’s got a king, he’s going to
play it on fourth street, because by checking, you’ve made him think
he’s got the best hand. Plus, if he does have a 6, as before, you
might be able to hold your losses to a minimum. A flop that’s
6-6-5 is a lot different, because there’s the possibility of a straight
draw.
What it all boils down to is that with a pair of aces or kings, you’re
waiting until you get into what you think is a favorable situation before
you really play a big pot. You’re not looking to play a big pot
if there’s only a small chance you’ll have the best of it
or one where you’re a big underdog.
In general, with those big pairs on the flop, you play them a little more
aggressively from a late position than from an early position, but you
should be aware that someone might be checking the nuts to you, such as
three sixes in the examples used. You never worry about that. I’ve
heard people say, “Well, I was afraid to bet because I was afraid
he’d raise me.” Never worry about getting raised. You have
to go ahead and play. If it happens, it happens, and then you worry about
it. Don’t cross that bridge until you come to it.
You can’t play winning poker by playing safe all the time. You must
take chances. You must gamble. And you have to feel aggressive to play
aggressively. That’s my style of poker. And it’s a winning
style.
I’ve re-stated my general philosophy of play at this point because
I’m discussing the play of a pair of aces or kings in the hole.
In many cases, I play them slowly, but I don’t slow-play them. That
is, I play them cautiously. This is contrary to my usual style of play
and to the way most people play them. Most players feel that aces or kings
are so hard to come by that when they do get them they want to win a big
pot. So they play them real fast. That’s usually wrong, but there
are exceptions that I’ll discuss below. The fact is, with a pair
of aces or kings, one of two things will usually happen:
(1) You win a small pot; or
(2) You lose a big pot.
The reason is that your opponent is not going to get a lot of money in
the pot unless he can beat your big pair or has a straight or flush draw.
In the latter case, as you’ll see below, I’m going to make
him pay to draw to his hand.
I also play two aces or kings slowly in the rare instance that a set of
trips flops, say three sevens or three jacks. But this time I do it for
somewhat different reasons. In this case, I want my opponent in the pot
to improve his hand or catch up with me. So I check it, but just one time.
I want to give him a free card so he can catch a pair or get a chance
to bluff at it. It’s tough to win anything in that spot by leading
off unless you catch somebody with a pair in the pocket.
Of course, there’s a small chance you could run into quads, but
anyone who made that hand will let you know it by the way he puts all
his money in the pot. It takes experience to recognize something like
that, but it’s just like any other situation where somebody’s
betting the pure nuts at you. You have to use judgment to evaluate it.
After a while, you recognize it. As always, it boils down to reading people.
The one situation where I stand to lose a very big pot with a pair of
aces or kings is when there are two to a straight or flush on the flop.
For example, say there’s a J-10-2 out there. If somebody bet at
me, I’d move in a lot of chips. I could win the pot right there.
If not, my opponent is really going to pay to draw to his hand. If I were
first to act, I’d check, hoping I’d get the chance to raise
it. This is one of the few times I check-raise.
If I get called, I’ll probably put my opponent on a straight or
flush draw. Of course, on fourth street I’ll go ahead and bet again
if a meaningless card or blank falls. Again, this involves a lot of good
judgment, because my opponent might have been fortunate enough to make
some kind of hand that would beat my two aces, such as jacks and tens.
In that case, I’d go ahead and pay him off because, as I said earlier,
I’m not going to try to out-guess myself.
If the board fell completely ragged, say a 10-6-5, I would bet from any
position. As in all the hands I’ve discussed, there’s always
the chance that someone flopped a set. But again, I’m going to cross
that bridge if and when I come to it. In this situation, I’d know
if my big pair was beat, especially if I had raised with my hand from
an early position before the flop. All good hold’em players would
interpret that as a sign of strength. I mean, the first thing you usually
give a man, especially a weaker player, credit for when he raises is a
big pair. So if it comes a
10-6-5 and I had raised from an early position, the other players will
think that I have a strong hand, possibly a big pair, which I’ve
got. Then when I bet on the flop and get raised by somebody in a late
position, it gets back to evaluating people again. You’ve just got
to know your players. He’s representing to you that he can beat
a big pair. If he’s a good, solid-type player, what else can he
have besides a set of trips or possibly two pair? So you make up your
mind right there whether or not to go ahead with your two aces or two
kings.
Of course, it’s possible that he has a pair of queens or jacks in
a back position and didn’t raise you before the flop, but that now
on the flop he’s decided to test you, because he’s got an
overpair. You might want to call his raise one time if it’s not
too big a bet. The next time, check it to him and see what he does. If
he bets again, he’s usually there.
Playing with Help on the Flop. Up to now, I’ve discussed how I’d
play a pair of aces or kings on the flop assuming I didn’t flop
anything that helped my hand. Now I’ll discuss the situations where
I get some help.
If I flop a set, I never slow-play it. There is one exception to this
rule, which I’ll discuss below. But for the most part, I almost
always come right out and bet, and I don’t make just a nominal bet.
I make an extra-large bet because you’ll only win a big pot if an
opponent flops something with you, puts you on a bluff, or tries to run
you down. So, I really come out smokin’ right there.
Earlier, I said that when you have a pair of aces and a single ace flops,
there’ll always be the possibility that the next card off will make
someone a straight. For instance, look at the following situation:
FLOP A
With a single ace on the flop and anything 5 or under, there’s
always a draw to a 5-high straight. As in Flop A, if a deuce, trey or
5 falls on fourth street, it could make someone a small straight.
The same thing applies whenever there’s a single ace on the flop
with any card 10 or above.
FLOP B
With Flop C, a king, queen, or 10 on fourth might give someone an ace-high
straight. If there’s no draw to a straight that includes an ace,
then there’ll be a draw to a medium straight because there’d
have to be a two-card combination of the other four cards, namely a 6,
7, 8, or 9, as in the following example:
FLOP C
The straight possibility is more obvious with something like Flop C because
there are seven different straights that can be made. If anyone has a
J-10, J-8, 10-8, 10-6, 8-6, 8-5, or 6-5, they could make a straight with
the next card off.
You should always keep this interesting discovery in mind whenever you
see what appears to be a raggedy flop with an ace in it. The threat that
someone could make a straight will always be present.
So when you flop a set of aces, you immediately go to betting, and you
bet a large amount to prevent somebody from drawing at an inside straight
cheaply. A good player will know it’s worth it to take a cheap draw
at a belly straight, and if he makes it, he can break you.
However, if you flop a set with two kings you could possibly give a free
card if it comes ragged and there’s no straight or flush draw. For
example, say a K-8-2 falls. Now, you can give a card with that flop because
you’d have the nuts as long as any card other than an ace, 8, or
deuce fell. An ace might give someone three aces, and an 8 or deuce could
possibly make someone four-of-a-kind. Realistically you shouldn’t
worry about quads, so you really want an 8 or deuce to hit the board on
fourth street.
In the rare instance when you flop quads, say four aces, you’re
happy to have them, but you really don’t have a very profitable
hand. You’ve got the deck crippled. There’s nothing left that
your opponents can have. When you flop a hand that big, you just have
to check along and maybe try to win a small bet on the end. Or, if you’re
extremely fortunate, you might get somebody to try to bluff at it. They
just might try to pick up the pot by representing a hand. You could get
lucky that way; but most of the time, you just play it very slow and take
what you can get, meaning that you always bet on the end from any position.
Here’s another situation where I almost always check: Say I flopped
the highest possible full house, known as the big full. That’s what
you would have with two aces if the flop was A-3-3, or with two kings
if it came K-7-7.
If you do have the big full, you’ll have some leverage, so you could
give them a free card in most situations (see below for the exception).
After you check it once, you bet on fourth, hoping that somebody hit something
there.
Whenever you’ve got a hand that’s so big you’ve got
the deck crippled or one that’s very unlikely to get beaten, you
should play it very slow on the flop for two reasons:
(1) You want to give your opponents a chance to bluff.
(2) You want to give them a chance to catch something if they don’t
bluff.
With a pair of aces or kings there’s a chance you could flop a
straight or flush draw. It would almost always be a gutshot straight draw,
with the exception of a Q-J-10 when you had kings. In any case, if I flopped
a straight draw, I’d be cautious with my hand. I could easily be
beat at that point because any flop that would give me a straight draw
could easily make my opponent two pair. I wouldn’t fool with that
hand. But if I’ve got the two red aces and three diamonds flop,
well, as I noted earlier, that’s a very big hand. I’d play
that hand from the hip, and I’d be willing to put all my money in
with it.
You should always remember that the flop is practically the whole game
in hold’em. That’s where your major decisions will be made.
The play on fourth street and fifth street is pretty basic by comparison.
For example, on the flop, you put your opponent on a particular hand,
and all your thinking follows from that. If you think he’s drawing
at a club flush, you bet. You must make your opponents pay to make their
draws. If the club doesn’t come on fourth street, you bet again.
Obviously, if the club comes and you think your opponent made his hand,
you check it. If you think you’re beat, naturally, you check it.
And if you think your opponent is drawing, you bet. That’s the whole
thing.
On fifth street, also called the river, if it looks like your opponent
has missed his hand, there’s usually no reason to bet any further.
So you just show your hand over, or you check it and give him a chance
to bluff.
That’s no-limit hold’em in a nutshell, but as you know, it’s
a far more complex game than that. As you continue reading, you should
be aware that my advice is intended to provide you with some general guidelines.
I keep emphasizing this because it’s so important that you understand
it. There’s not a single play that I’ll always make with a
particular hand. I’m liable to play every hand differently depending
on the circumstances. The standards I have guide me in a general direction,
as they should you. But sometimes, even I don’t know exactly what
I’m going to do until the situation comes up. Whatever my first
feeling or impression is at the time, I’d go with that.
For example, I said I’d check my pair of aces one time if there
were an open set of trips on the flop. On fourth street, if a man made
a big bet, or if I bet and he moved-in on me, I’d probably go ahead
and pay him off. If a man’s lucky enough to flop quads when I’ve
got two aces, he’d have to show me— unless I’ve got
a lot of money in front of me and there’s not too much money in
the pot.
Let’s look at a specific example, just, remember that no matter
what I say now, I might do just the opposite if the situation calls for
it. That depends on a lot of things, especially the guy in the pot with
me. What do I know about him? So it’s back to people again. Nevertheless,
here’s what I might do.
Let’s say there’s $20,000 in the pot. I’ve got $70,000
on the table. My opponent has $20,000, and he moves in on me. In that
case, I’d probably pay him off if I knew him to be a player, as
opposed to a rock.
However, if my opponent also had $70,000 and over-bet the pot by moving
in his entire stack, well, then I’m not sure what I’d do.
As I said, I’d go with my feelings. I’d look at him and then
I’d decide. To start with, if he made a move like that I’d
turn my hand face-up on the board. And I’d watch him real close.
I’d want to see what his reaction was when I turned the two aces
up. It would take a strong man not to show some kind of emotion. And from
the emotion I saw, I’d judge whether he had quads or not. Then I’d
react according to whichever way I felt.
Fourth and Fifth Streets
As I noted, you continue to bet your big pair on fourth street when it
rags off and it doesn’t look like it completed the straight or flush
draw that showed on the flop. If your opponent wants to draw again, you
make him pay for it.
If you flopped a set, you should also continue to bet on fourth even if
it does look like someone might have completed a straight. You can’t
worry about it because you don’t know which straight it is, if it
was made at all. Just disregard any straight card and go ahead and bet.
But if a third flush card fell on the turn, then I’d probably check
it. If someone bet, I’d call it, thinking that I’m probably
beat but trying to make a full. I mean, I wouldn’t know for sure
that I was beat, but I’d call knowing there was a strong possibility
I was. And I’d call a pretty big bet.
If the man moved all-in on me in that spot, I’d probably give him
credit for the flush. Then whether or not to call is a matter of simple
mathematics. Ten cards out of the forty-five left would help my hand,
assuming the last ace is still in the deck, as are three each of the other
three cards on the board that could pair and make my full. That means
it’s 35 to 10, or 3 to 1, that I won’t improve my hand. If
the pot’s laying me more than 3 to 1, I’d call. If not, I’d
throw my hand away.
Of course, that formula only applies when you feel very strongly that
your opponent has the flush made. If you think you could have the hand
wrong and your opponent might have the second set of trips or some other
hand, then you might call if the pot was laying you less odds. You could
accept a smaller price because you have some doubts.
So much depends on your judgment in situations like that. This is especially
true on the end. If I didn’t make my full there and I was forced
to call another bet, it would be completely up to my judgment.
When I discussed how I’d play my big pair when I flopped a full,
I said that I’d almost always check it. I’d make an exception,
though, if two of the cards on the flop were suited, or maybe even two
to a straight. In that case, I would not check on the flop—I would
bet. I’d be trying to get a man in there drawing to a flush and
hoping that he makes it so I can break him. And if a flush card did come
on fourth street, I’d bet, expecting and hoping to be raised.
I’d play the hand similarly if I had flopped a set and the board
paired on the end, making my full and at the same time making a possible
flush for somebody. Whenever you’ve got a full and a three-flush
comes, it’s exactly the situation you’re looking for. You
go ahead and bet—even an extraordinarily big bet—and you can
break your opponent. You should not, by the way, bet as much with a three-card
straight out there because your opponent may not have the nut straight.
He may even be drawing. So in either case, if you’ve got him dead,
you want him to play his straight if he made it or draw at it. And a very
big bet might scare him off.
In the case where you flopped a set and the board pairs on fourth or fifth
but there’s no possible straight or flush out there—say the
board is A? 6? J? J?—you should lead with your full. Don’t
slow-play it. In fact, you should make a big bet, bigger than the size
of the pot.
There’s a good possibility that your opponent was calling you on
the flop with the second pair or possibly the third pair. So when the
board paired, it might’ve made him a strong hand, and you’d
be in a position to break him. He’d probably play back if he made
trips when the board paired. Also, knowing your aggressive style of play,
he might think you’re trying to represent his hand, and you might
get a good play because of that.
But if a flush draw was out there on the flop and the pair on fourth didn’t
complete the flush, well, then I’d make a small bet, smaller than
the size of the pot. I want him to call so he’ll have an opportunity
to make the flush on the last card.
But what if you don’t make a big hand with two aces or kings? You’ll
have to play them very carefully in certain instances on fourth and fifth
streets. For example, if there were three rags on the flop and then the
board paired on fourth or fifth, I’d definitely slow down. This
is not the same situation as when a pair came on the flop. When the pair
shows after the flop, the possibility is much stronger that it helped
your opponent. He’s already called you on the flop, indicating that
his cards fit into the community cards. His call clearly meant that he
had something, so I’d be cautious again in that situation.
You are facing a somewhat different situation when there are four rags
out there and the board pairs on fifth street. Exactly what I’d
do depends on which card was paired and whether I had bet on the flop
and on fourth. If the top card or possibly the second card paired, I’d
suspect I might be beat. They’d be the two most dangerous pairs.
If I had bet on the flop and on fourth street and the third or fourth
highest card paired, I wouldn’t be concerned.
Another time you should not be at all concerned is when the flop is say,
8-8-5 and then the third 8 falls on fourth or on the end. You just don’t
worry about quads. So actually your hand got stronger on fourth street.
Before the third 8 showed, there was the nagging possibility your opponent
had trips. That’s far less likely now, and he’s probably in
there with an overpair.
A very tough situation could exist on fifth when there are four to a flush
or straight, and you don’t have any of it. With a big pair in that
spot, it’s back to judgment again. You have to evaluate what you
think your opponent was drawing at and whether or not he’s got one
of the cards that would complete the straight or flush.
You should never bet in that situation. If he’s first and he checks,
you should just show it down. If you are first, you’d check it.
If he bets, well, you’re back to people. You’d just have to
evaluate your player.
That situation brings to mind a play I often make. I’ve played a
lot of pots against tight players when I’ve made a very weak call
on fourth street, hoping the last card will make a four-card straight
or flush on the board so I could represent the straight or flush by making
a big bet. For example, my tight opponent has raised before the flop and
I feel he has a big pair in the pocket. The situation might look like
this:
My opponent bets on the flop, and I call. The next card is the 2?, and
if my opponent bets again, I’ll call—not because I think I
have the best hand, but because of the tremendous bluffing opportunity
I’ll have if the last card is a 3, 4, 8, or 9. Any one of those
four cards will mean the board is one card off of a straight. I’ll
almost certainly win the pot if, as in the example, a 4 fell on fifth
and I represent the straight by making a substantial bet on the end.
There’s also a chance that I’ll catch a 10 or 7 on the end.
I’d win a nice pot in that case as well, so I’m justified
in calling on fourth street. I do a lot of gambling like that on fourth
and on the end. And they’re good gambles because I know a tight
player wouldn’t jeopardize all his money when one card would beat
him.
It’s not only tough for a tight player to make a call for all his
money in a situation like that, it’s tough for anyone to do it.
But if you know your opponent, it does make it easier. If the straight
or flush is made on fourth and fifth streets, a backdoor job, then you
may want to reconstruct the play of the entire hand and try to determine
whether that particular player would have gone as far as he did to make
the hand. Of course, a lot of times a player will literally back into
a hand like that. For example, he may have started with a small pair on
the flop, picked up a straight or flush draw on fourth, and got there
on the end without really trying.
With two aces or kings, you’re going to have to use a lot of judgment
when all the cards are out and your hand never got better. You’d
have to go back to what you originally felt your opponent was drawing
at on the flop and on fourth street. If you thought he made what he was
drawing at on the last card, well, obviously, you’d check it, whether
you were first or last to act. If you were first and you thought he was
drawing at a hand and completely missed it, you’d still check. But
this time you’d be doing it to give him an opportunity to bluff
at it. If you were last and it looked like he missed his hand then he
checked it to you, you’d just turn your hand over to avoid being
wrong in your judgment. He’s not going to call you if he missed
his draw. But if you put him on the wrong hand to begin with, you could
get raised.
A-K
Before the Flop
A-K vs. A-A or K-K. I’ve already mentioned that I’d rather
have A-K than either a pair of aces or a pair of kings. A lot of players
will probably find that surprising. But it’s not. You’ll soon
see why.
Of course, I know that an A-K would never outrun A-A or K-K if you played
them against one another hot and cold. An A-K couldn’t even beat
a pair of deuces. I know from experience.
Once, on a proposition bet, I took the deuces and two other guys took
the A-K. The proposition was to play the two hands against one another
hot and cold. We simply dealt out five cards to see which hand would win
more times. It was an even-money bet, and we bet $500 a hand. I won several
thousand dollars before they quit. They weren’t convinced the first
time, so we did it two or three more times. They’d lose some money
and quit. They’d go away, do some homework, come back, and then
we’d do it again. And I’d beat them again.
But I’m not talking about playing hot and cold here. Now I’m
talking about playing poker. An A-K is a better hand than two aces or
two kings for two very important reasons:
(1) You’ll win more money when you make a hand with it.
(2) You’ll lose less money when you miss a hand with it.
And I can’t think of two better reasons to choose an A-K over the
very big pairs.
You can make more money with an A-K because it’s a drawing type
of hand as opposed to a made hand, like two aces or kings. I mean, you
don’t have anything with an A-K unless you hit something, so you
can get away from it real easy. You’re not tied on to it like you
might be with a pair of aces or kings. And that’s why you’ll
lose less money with it.
Furthermore, when you have A-K and you pair the ace or king on the flop,
if your opponent is playing something like two connecting cards, it’s
much harder for him to make his hand than it would be if you had a big
pair. For example, say you had two aces in the pocket, your opponent is
playing a 7-6, and the board came 9-8-5, or any three cards that could
help his hand, such as a pair and a draw. That one extra card considerably
improves his chances of cracking your aces. On the other hand, say you
have A-K, your opponent has 7-6, and the board comes A-9-8. In this case,
he hasn’t made anything yet because you’ve paired one of your
holecards and now there are only two cards that will help him. Here’s
the exception to this rule: say the flop is three to a big straight with
maybe two to a flush, like:
A? J? 10? or K? J? 10?. In this case, the ace or king helps both you and
your opponent. Later on, we’ll discuss why A-K is also a more flexible
hand as far as how you can play it.
Suited vs. Offsuit. In the discussion to follow, the difference between
the two hands is sometimes ignored. That is, I’m going to suggest
playing them the same way. But you should always remember that A-K suited
has more value than A-K offsuit and it can always be played a little stronger.
Anytime the cards are suited it’s a somewhat stronger hand than
when they’re offsuit. This is especially true with A-K because you
can make the nut flush. There’s another big difference between A-K
suited and A-K offsuit: with A-K suited it only takes three cards to make
a flush. True, you can make one of two flushes with A-K offsuit, but it
takes four cards to make either one. That’s a lot harder to do.
And even if you make the flush with the king, you might not have the nuts.
Flexibility. The reason why A-K is more flexible than A-A or K-K is that
you can play an A-K in the lead or you can play it slow to raise with
it. Also, I’d play A-K from any position for a reasonable size bet.
And, on occasion, I’d get all my money in before the flop, as you’ll
see below.
Playing from Early Position. Specifically, in an early position, I’d
raise the blind, bring it in, for whatever the normal bring-in is for
that particular game. If I was raised, I’d probably call, although
I don’t like to call a raise with A-K, as most players do. I like
to raise with it.
Playing from Middle Position. If I were in a middle position and someone
else had brought it in, I’d just call with A-K. I wouldn’t
raise because I’d probably be raising just one man. I’d want
at least one more player to come in.
Playing from Late Position. In a late position, I’d probably raise
with it, especially if I were on the button.
Moving All-In. There are times I might even move all-in with an A-K.
Let’s say I brought it in from an early position, and a couple of
people behind me just called. When it gets to the guy on the button, he
raises. I’d think he was trying to pick up the pot since the two
people behind me showed weakness. He’s probably thinking the only
person he had to come through is me, so I might move all here.
Or if I were on the button and three or four people were already in the
pot, I might move all-in, trying to pick the pot up. At that point, I’d
know that if I got called I’d probably be a slight underdog to a
pair.
The Flop
As long as I don’t help my A-K on the flop, I’m going to play
the hand the same way regardless of whether or not the flop might’ve
helped someone else. For example, if three rags, a pair, three to a straight
or flush, or anything that does not help my hand flops, I play A-K quite
simply. Barring one exception that I’ll go into later, here’s
what I’d do:
(1) If I had been the bettor to start with or if I had been the raiser,
I’d bet from any position.
(2) If I had called with A-K, I’d check.
(3) If there was a bet in front of me, I’d pass.
As I’ve already said, I play almost all my hands that way because
if I was the bettor or raiser before the flop then I’ve represented
a hand. So I’ll bet on the flop regardless of what comes. I’ll
do it nine times out of ten.
You might have noticed that this is quite different from the way I’d
play two aces or two kings. With either of those pairs in an early position,
I’d check it if there were three to a straight or flush on the flop.
Remember, I hear a bell ringing in that situation that reminds me not
to bet. So if I’ve got a hand, like a pair in the pocket, I play
it slow. But if I’m bluffing, I go ahead and play it fast, meaning
I’ll take one shot at it.
I do that because I know for sure I’m not going to go any further
with an A-K if somebody plays back at me. If somebody plays back when
I’m holding two aces or two kings, I’ve got a decision to
make. But when I have nothing, I can bet A-K with confidence because I’m
gone if I get raised. I just throw my hand away because there’s
nothing for me to think about. Now you can see why you’re less likely
to lose a big pot with A-K than with two aces or two kings.
When there’s nothing on the flop that’ll help me and I do
go ahead and play the hand, I’ll make a reasonable bet, somewhere
in the neighborhood of the size of the pot. But as always, there are exceptions.
On rare occasions, I’d revert back to the same philosophy I use
with aces and kings. For example, if the fall was a J? 10? 9?, I’d
never bluff. I wouldn’t even fool with the pot if only two of those
cards were suited. You know somebody’s going to have something.
Here again, you have to use your judgment. It’s an extreme situation.
This also explains why I’ll bet on the flop 90 percent of the time
but not every single the time if I played my hand strong before the flop.
There are times when you know somebody must have flopped something. And
bluffing at a pot in that situation will rarely succeed. So you just give
it up.
If I get some help on the flop by catching an ace or a king, I’d
make a reasonable bet at the pot from any position. The only time I might
check-raise in this situation is when I had called in a middle position
before the flop and the original raiser before the flop was behind me.
When someone plays back at me in this situation I’ll either move
in or release my hand, depending on what flopped. In order for me to move
in I’d have to think my opponent was drawing to his hand. For example,
if the flop came A? 10? 9?, I’d put him on a flush draw or maybe
a straight draw, and I’d move in. Of course, if my opponent flopped
three nines, he’d be in an ideal position to win a lot of money.
It would look to me like he was drawing at a straight, flush, or both,
and if he was lucky enough to have flopped a set, well, there’s
nothing magical I could do. I’d just have to go ahead and pay him
off.
On the other hand, if it came off ragged, like a K? 8? 2?, I might release
my A-K, thinking that he possibly flopped a set.
If a pair of aces or kings flopped, giving me trips, and the other card
is not one that’ll give someone a straight or flush draw, I might
check-raise. But I probably wouldn’t because I like to lead with
it. It’s a very strong hand and as long as a pat hand, like a straight
or a flush, can’t be dealt off on the next card, I might give a
free card in this situation so my opponent would have a chance to make
something on fourth street. But I’d only give a free card if I were
last to act. If I were first to act, I wouldn’t. I would lead with
that hand.
If I flopped two pair, aces and kings, I’d play them almost identically
to trips. It’s almost the same hand.
The important thing to remember is that anytime there’s a possible
draw on the flop, you should almost never check—you should almost
always bet.
In the extremely rare case when I flop quads, I don’t have any alternative,
there’s nothing else left, so I have to check it. If I bet, I could
catch a man with a pair of queens or jacks, and he might accidentally
pay me off. But realistically, I’d check it and hope that a 10,
jack, or queen falls on fourth street and pairs someone. Then I’d
bet hoping someone calls me with a full.
If a Q-J-10 flopped—giving me the nut straight—and I were
the raiser, I’d lead again. Only this time it would not be a reasonable
bet; it would be an abnormal size bet. I’d over-bet the pot when
that flop came because somebody figures to have made something, like a
smaller straight, possibly trips or two pair, or a pair and a straight
draw. That’s the type of hand most players move in with. So I’d
probably get him to bet all his money, and he’d be almost dead.
If I were holding A-K and had called before the flop, I wouldn’t
slow-play it. I’d raise because the original raiser figures to have
a hand that would fit the Q-J-10 flop. He could have two aces or two kings,
three queens or three jacks, or a pair of queens with an ace or king kicker.
He’s liable to go all the way to fifth street if he has any one
of those hands, and he’d get all his chips in the middle.
If the flop came J-10-2 and I have a belly-straight draw and two overcards
with an A-K, I’d call a reasonable bet. I’d really be trying
to catch a queen, because if I caught an ace or king, I’d have to
be careful with it. An ace could make someone else a stronger hand than
my own, say a straight or two pair.
But if I flop two of my flush cards when I have A-K suited, I have a very
powerful hand. At that point, I’m a favorite over any overpair,
with the exception of a pair of aces or kings. I’d lead with that
hand, of course, and I’d also lead off and bet if I actually had
a flush with A-K suited. I would not check-raise with my flush because
my opponent doesn’t figure to have made much on the flop. But he
might call me with one pair, or he might accidentally have made a small
flush. He might think I’m drawing to a flush, especially since I’m
an aggressive player, and he might call me all the way through with just
one pair.
Fourth and Fifth Streets
If I’m holding A-K and I make a pair on the flop, I’d play
my hand on fourth and fifth streets almost the same way I’d play
with a pair of aces or kings in the pocket. If I think my opponent made
the hand he was drawing at, I’d check. If I don’t think he
made it, I’d bet.
However, I would make an exception if I thought I had my opponent out-kicked.
That is, I might keep betting with A-K if I put my opponent on a hand
that’s a little bit worse than mine. For example, if I think he
might’ve paired aces or kings with me but that he’s got a
smaller kicker, I’d bet the highest amount I think he’ll call,
hoping to sell my hand. I wouldn’t try as hard to sell a pair of
aces or kings in the pocket because he might’ve been drawing to
beat them. If I’ve got A-K however, there’s a good chance
he’s got the top card, an ace or king, paired with me but that my
kicker or side card is higher.
The important point to remember is that unlike A-A or K-K, A-K is a drawing-type
hand. It’s therefore a much easier hand to get away from than the
very big pairs.
Q-Q
I’ve put a pair of queens in a separate category for the simple
reason that it’s a hand that deserves special treatment. You’ll
soon see why.
When I get two queens in the pocket, I play them very carefully. I try
not to play them too strongly from any position. Unless a good situation
arises, I don’t want to move in before the flop with two queens.
A good situation would be one where I’m in a very late position,
possibly on the button, and four people have called a raise in front of
me. Here, I might try to shut them out by moving in. I’d use the
combined strength of my pair of queens and my position.
If you’re up against two aces or two kings with a pair of queens,
you’re about a 4 to 1 underdog. And if you’re up against A-K,
you’re only a little better than a 6 to 5 favorite. When people
go all-in before the flop they usually have one of those hands. So if
you go all-in before the flop with two queens, your money is in a lot
of jeopardy. If you get called, you’re probably up against
A-A, K-K, or A-K, in which case you’ll be a big dog or just a small
favorite. There are better spots to get all your money in.
That’s not to say two queens don’t have a certain amount of
value. They do. They’re considerably better than an average hand.
But for the reason I just mentioned, I seldom raise back with a pair of
queens from any position. But I will raise the blind a reasonable amount
with two queens from any position if nobody else raised in front of me.
In a middle position, if somebody raised in front of me I’d just
call, as I would with any pair. I’d just call with them in a late
position, too. I wouldn’t reraise, except in the situation mentioned
above.
I also play two queens very slow on the flop, hoping to catch a third
queen. If either an ace or a king comes on the flop, I’d play the
hand as slowly as possible. If someone bets with any authority, I’d
probably give him the pot. As long as an ace or king doesn’t fall,
I’d play two queens almost exactly the way I’d play two aces
or two kings, and that includes the play on fourth and fifth streets.
In addition to the times when an ace or king flops, I’d play queens
differently from two aces or kings when there’s a flush draw on
the flop. In that case, I wouldn’t be eager to get all my money
in. A man with a flush draw could also have an overcard, such as an ace
or king. If he did, it would make his hand almost as strong as my Q-Q,
as opposed to two aces or two kings against only a flush draw, either
of which would be about a 9 to 5 favorite.
If you keep these differences in mind and make the right adjustments to
your play, your approach with two queens on the flop, fourth, and fifth
should be similar to your approach with aces or kings. In fact, you can
play all pairs in the pocket in very much the same way, as you’ll
see.
Pairs Other Than Aces, Kings, and Queens
I’m going to refer to all the pairs from jacks down to deuces as
small pairs, except when I name a particular pair. However, it should
be obvious that the bigger the pair, the more valuable it is. And that
principle extends all the way down to the very small pairs. That is, a
pair of fours is better than a pair of treys for the simple reason that
when the flop is 4-3-2, if someone flopped three fours he’d be a
huge favorite, about 22 to 1, over someone who flopped three treys.
Furthermore, I mentally separate a pair of jacks, tens, or nines from
the other small pairs and play them a little stronger. I do it simply
because they are bigger pairs, and it’s not unusual for three rags
to fall. If that happens, you’ll have an overpair. But if you’ve
got two fives or two sixes, it’s likely that the flop will have
at least one overcard. And with an overcard out there, your hand is kind
of dead, so you don’t want to get too much money involved. Again,
the higher the pair, the better, but I play them all as if they are small
pairs.
Before the flop, with any of the small pairs except jacks, tens, and nines,
I’d limp in. If somebody raised it from an early or middle position,
I’d call it. I wouldn’t reraise. I’d almost always take
a flop with any small pair, hoping to flop a set so I could break somebody.
With a pair of jacks, tens, or nines, if somebody raised from an early
position, I’d probably just call. But if it was raised from a middle
or late position, I might reraise if I felt the raiser was weak. The reason
I might do that is because the probability is good I’ll have an
overpair on the flop. In that case, I’d play nines, tens, and jacks
just like I’d play two queens. The same strategy would apply.
However, I want to note a special exception I’d make in a very unusual
situation. One of the reasons I like to play the small pairs from any
position is because they give me an opportunity to slow down and not appear
to be overbearingly aggressive when it might work against me. They also
give me a chance to show a little respect for a particular opponent.
As you know, if I raise a pot before the flop, I’m going to bet
on the flop about 90 percent of the time, no matter what it is. So if
I raised the pot with two nines, I’d bet on the flop nine times
out of ten. But let’s say I’m in the pot with a guy I’ve
been pounding on and pounding on all night long. And that guy’s
a real good player who I know is getting very tired of me pounding on
him. I also know I’ve probably got him beat. But rather than bet
him out of the pot, I’m going to purposely slow down against him.
An example will best show you what I mean and explain why I do it.
Let’s say I’ve got two nines and I raise my opponent before
the flop. He calls. The flop comes 10-2-3, and he checks it. I check along.
Another rag falls off on fourth street. He checks again. Now, I’m
reasonably sure my two nines are the best hand. But I’m not going
to bet it. I’ll check along with him to show him some respect. The
board’s awful looking and I’m pretty sure he doesn’t
have any of it. I’m also quite sure that if I bet I’m not
going to get called. So I don’t bet.
It has nothing to do with feeling sorry for the man because if I thought
there was a good chance he’d call me, I’d surely bet. But
instead of pushing him out of the pot once more and getting him hotter
than he is, I check along with him to cool him off a little. Remember,
he’s a real good player. And although I’m quite sure he won’t
call me, I’m not so sure he won’t play back and put pressure
on me when I’ve got a hand that can’t stand much pressure.
What’s more, if he doesn’t put some kind of play on me in
this pot, he could do it at any time. If I keep pushing him out of every
pot, sooner or later he’s going to stop sticking his head up, and
I won’t be able to slap him anymore. Then he’s going to make
me guess. I don’t want that. I don’t want him to start getting
aggressive. That’s the hardest player in the world to beat, a guy
who you bet at and who’s always playing back at you. That’s
exactly the kind of opponent I don’t want to play against. I want
all my opponents to be docile.
So it kind of cools him out when I just show down a hand. He knows that
I know my two nines are the best hand. But by not betting them, I show
him some respect. And because I showed the hand down, I’ve got him
back to thinking that when I bet I’m either bluffing or I’ve
got a hand I’m going to go with. He’s back to guessing again.
And that’s exactly where I want him. I don’t want to antagonize
him to the point that he starts making me do the guesswork. It serves
a lot of purposes to slow down in a situation like that.
A short time later, I might pick up another pair of nines, tens, or jacks
in a very late position or on the button, and I might raise with it again.
This time, he might play back at me. If he does, he’d get the pot.
I’d give the pot to anyone who reraised me before the flop.
I’d never stand a reraise when I have a small pair before the flop.
I won’t take any pressure with them. If someone puts a play on me,
I throw them away. But if I don’t get reraised, I’m back to
my basic style of play. If I were the raiser, I’d go ahead and bet
on the flop. Just about any flop. If I raised with two tens and a 7-3-2
flopped, I’d bet for sure since I’ve got an overpair. However,
the only time my pair is of any real value is when I flop a set.
Nevertheless, I’d still bet if I was the raiser, even if three overcards
flopped. Even if I was sure a guy had a bigger pair on that flop, and
even if I was almost sure I’d get called, I’d still bet. I’d
be giving him the courtesy of a bet because there’s an outside chance
I could pick that pot up. And it wouldn’t be a small bet. It would
be a reasonable bet. He’d be looking for me to bet, and I don’t
want to disappoint him. It would hurt my table image.
I’ll do that 90 percent of the time. In this case, I’ll take
one stab at the pot and if I don’t get it there, I’ll try
to check it out from there on. I’d make an exception if I put a
guy on a draw. In that case, he’s going to have to pay to make his
hand. If I got raised, I surely wouldn’t go any further with the
hand.
I play small pairs cautiously and try to win small pots with them. I won’t
put a lot of chips in the pot unless I flop trips. And when I don’t
make trips with a small pair, whenever I bet, I’m bluffing from
then on.
Playing Small Pairs with No Help on the Flop
If I had called a raise before the flop and the raiser bet on the flop,
unless I flopped a set, I’d probably surrender the pot. That’s
especially true if an overcard flopped. So right there, you can see the
strength of being the raiser. He made me lay down my hand. That’s
why I like to be the raiser.
When you don’t help your small pair on the flop, it’s important
points to remember these points:
(1) If you just called before the flop, you’re through with them,
and you don’t put any more money in the pot from then on.
(2) If you raised with them, you should generally try to win a small pot
by betting on the flop. But if you get called, you don’t want to
bet again on fourth and fifth, and you should try to play showdown without
any more betting from that point on—unless you think your opponent
is on a draw, in which case you continue betting.
(3) If you get raised, you throw away your hand.
Playing Small Pairs When You Flop a Set
It’s a different situation entirely when you flop a set. That’s
what you played for. And you should play them fast. That’s what
I do, in almost all cases. I don’t always raise with them, but I
never check them. Needless to say, if I was the raiser and I flopped a
set, I immediately bet right out. As you know, I wouldn’t need a
set to do that. However, I would make an exception if I was in the pot
with a very weak player, and he was the only opponent I had. I’d
check in this case.
Say I had called before the flop, then I flop trips. If someone checks
it to me and there are people behind me, I’ll always bet.
As you know, one of my favorite plays in hold’em is to lead right
into the raiser with trips or even two pair, especially when I think he’s
got a big pair in the hole. I over-bet the pot right there, and if the
raiser has what he represented, a big pair, he’ll almost invariably
go ahead and move in on me.
I’d make that play when I’ve got a small pair, say threes,
and the flop is 10-7-3. I lead into the raiser, thinking he’s got
an overpair in the pocket. But a better flop would be one with a face
card, say Q-10-3. Now the raiser’s got to have some kind of combination
with a flop like that. If he’s got two aces or two kings and he’s
any kind of a player, he’s got to raise. If he’s got A-Q,
he’ll probably raise with that too. If he’s got K-Q he’ll
probably call. If he’s got a straight draw he’ll call, and
it’s possible that he’ll raise. So I lead right off into him.
If he’s fortunate enough to have my hand beat, well, again, there’s
nothing magical I can do about it. I’ll have to pay him off.
If someone had called in front of me and bets on the flop when it comes
like A-8-3 and I put him on a pair of aces, I’d probably play my
three threes slowly. I wouldn’t want to take him out of the lead.
Another time I start over-betting the pot on the flop is when I make the
underfull, such as when the flop comes 9-9-4 and I’ve got two fours
in the pocket. Well, I start making big bets right there because the only
way I’m going to win any money with my hand is by catching somebody
with a 9 or catching somebody with a big pair who calls or even raises
me. I want to be sure there’s enough money involved so I can win
a big pot. And, to be sure of that, I’ve got to lead with my hand.
Note that you play the underfull different from the way you’d play
the big full. If you remember, you play the big full by checking on the
flop because you’d have the deck crippled. In this case, you want
to give a free card to your opponent so he can catch up.
Are there times when you might release a set on the flop? Yes, but they’re
rare. It’s very hard to turn this hand loose. However, there is
a situation in which you might save some money. Say you have a small set,
and you bet on the flop. There’s a man in a late position who didn’t
raise it before the flop, so it’s unlikely that he has a big pair
in the pocket. Now, he makes a very strong play after the flop. I mean,
he moves all-in and puts your entire stack in jeopardy. At that point,
you might be able to determine that he’s got a set, and you might
be able to get away from your hand. But it’s very difficult. In
a high-stakes game, I almost never do it.
If you flop a set in a raised pot, it’s practically impossible to
get away from it. If the pot wasn’t raised, conceivably, you could
put a man on a bigger set than you’ve got. But if the pot was raised
originally, it’s just impossible to release a set.
If I raised it before the flop, then flop a set and get beat, well, my
opponent is going to win a real big pot from me. If we don’t get
it all-in on the flop, we’ll surely be all-in after fourth street.
Small Connecting Cards
Before the Flop
This is the hand I’m looking for when I play no-limit hold’em:
small, suited connecting cards, such as 7? 6?, 8? 7?, and
5? 4?. That’s the kind of hand I want. It’s my favorite. And
when I get it, I want my opponent to have two aces or two kings and to
believe that he should play them slow. If he does, he’ll give me
the opportunity to get a flop. And if I do, I can break him.
Exactly such a situation occurred in the 1977 World Series of Poker. It
was definitely the most important and memorable pot of the tournament,
bigger and more important than the pot I played with Bones, which I mentioned
earlier. Not only did I win it, but I eliminated two very tough opponents.
Here’s what happened:
At this stage of the tournament, the ante was $200 and there were blinds
of $300 and $600. Junior Whited had the big blind for $600. Buck Buchanan
limped in for the six hundred. “Sailor” Roberts passed. Bones
was next, and he made it $3,500 to go. I called, and so did Milo Jacobson.
When it got back to Junior, he went all-in for $11,300. Buck was now looking
at two raises: Bones’s $2,900 and Junior’s $8,400. He called,
as did Bones. And so did I. Milo passed. It was a big pot already and
destined to get bigger.
The flop was 5? 7? 7?.
FLOP
Fourth street was A? and fifth street was 4?.
4TH St. 5th St.
Junior was already all-in so Buck was first to act on the flop. He moved
all-in with a huge bet. Bones passed, so it was up to me. Buck could’ve
made his move and shut me out before the flop. He would’ve picked-up
$26,500 had he done so. Now it was too late. I had him. There was no doubt
in my mind about that. So I asked the dealer to count down his bet. It
was $45,400. I shoved in four-and-a-half 20-chip stacks of $500 grays
and four $100 black chips. I was the only one who had any chips left so
we all turned our hands over.
Buck had K? K?, Junior had K? Q?, and I had 7? 6?. As you can see, when
all the cards were out, the pot was mine. It was the only time in the
tournament that two players were eliminated in the same pot—and
two very tough ones at that.
In order to win that $142,500 pot, I had to gamble almost $12,000 with
those small connecting cards before the flop. I’d do it again. I
always do it when there’s an opportunity for me to win a real big
pot.
Buck and Junior had almost exactly the hands I thought they had. And when
Buck made his move on the flop, I was certain he had a pair of kings or
aces. He couldn’t have had anything else.
If Buck had played his hand the way I recommend, he would’ve won
a relatively small pot. As it was, he lost a big one, which is too often
the case with two aces or two kings. If you recall, I stated earlier that
with a pair of aces or kings in an early position before the flop, I would
probably limp in, hoping somebody would raise it behind me so I could
reraise. Buck got the first part right. If he’d followed the second
part and raised Junior, I never would’ve played my hand.
That’s the whole thing about the small connecting cards. I’ll
come in with them in an early or middle position. I might come in for
the first bet or, as you’ve seen, even the second if I think I can
win a real big pot. I probably won’t raise with this kind of hand
because I don’t want to get shut out of the pot. If I raise and
somebody else reraises, I probably won’t be able to play it. Or
if I have to call a double-raise cold, I probably won’t be able
to play it there either. There are always exceptions, but in general,
I play the hand in order to get a flop with it.
For the most part, you don’t want to put a whole lot of money in
the pot with small connecting cards before the flop. It’s best to
take a lot of flops with these hands. You want to get a flop, hoping to
make a little straight, a little set of trips, a little two pair, and
so on.
With any two cards to a straight flush, connected or not—except
for the top and bottom cards of a straight-flush, such as the 8? 4? or
J? 7?—I’d come in from any position. In a late position, I’d
raise with them. When I come in with this hand in an early or middle position
I’m really looking to get raised. In fact, I’m hoping someone
has a big pair in the hole and raises behind me. Then I can put a relatively
small amount of additional money in the pot, and if I get a flop, I can
break him.
The beautiful part about having the small connecting cards is that if
I don’t get any help, I throw them away. If the flop comes 9-9-2,
for example, I don’t get involved with a 7-6. I’m through.
Normally, I wouldn’t want to get more than 5 percent, maybe 10 percent,
of my money involved before the flop with this type of hand. I’d
only get as much as 20 percent of my money in with that hand if I was
rushing. I wouldn’t do it unless I was on a streak.
There are also times when I might raise from early or middle position
with something like a 7-6. I noted that I generally just call. But if
the tempo of the game were just right, I’d raise in an early or
middle position.
For example, if I were winning a lot of pots, I’d do it. I said
that I usually play the next pot after I win a pot, regardless of what
position I’m in. And when I play that pot, I usually raise it. Also,
if the game had tightened down to the point where everybody was playing
the nuts, I’d shoot it up with a couple of small connecting cards.
Of course, you always try to keep from getting reraised with that hand.
So, the ideal situation is when you think your muscle will keep anyone
from playing back and will make your opponents think you’ve probably
got big cards or a big pair.
I raise with this hand in a late position because I don’t think
I’ll get reraised. Also, since nobody’s raised in front of
me, I’ll be able to use some deception. I usually don’t raise
in an early position because I’d have to go through six or seven
players without getting reraised. With a lot of top players in the game,
that’s not likely. Also, I like to be in the lead, and if I make
something with it, I can take charge. So with players behind me, I usually
call with it.
In this situation, I don’t have to maintain my table image by betting
on the flop when I’m the raiser. If I just called before the flop
and somebody else raised, I very seldom try to pick up the pot or bluff
into the raiser. The raiser commands respect. So when I miss that hand
completely and somebody else raised it, well, it’s his pot. That’s
why I generally like to be the raiser.
I don’t like to raise with small connecting cards because when somebody
has the hand I want him to have, such as a big pair, he’s going
to raise me back. That’s one more reason I usually limp-in with
them. When I limp in with this hand in an early position, I’m actually
playing it like I would two aces or two kings, so there’s also a
bit of deception there. And if somebody raises in a middle or late position,
I can pretty well put them on a hand—big cards like A-K, K-Q, or
a big pair. That’s what I’m looking to do. I want to be able
to put somebody on a hand so I know what I’m trying to beat.
If you play in the style I recommend, very aggressively, you’ll
have to adjust your play in a small game. You’ll probably discover
that you get reraised more often when you raise in a small game than you
will in a big game. That’s been my experience.
Here’s why: if I’m in a game where there’s not much
money on the table—say, everybody has $5,000 or $6,000—and
I raise it $1,000, well, a guy with big cards is going to move in on me.
It happens all the time in a small game. And when I’ve got a 7-6
or a 9-8 and someone bets the rest of his money at me, I can’t call
it. When I can’t win anything if I get a flop, I’m not going
to take two small connecting cards and try to beat two kings, A-K, and
so forth. In a case like that, I throw my hand away. And because of that,
I have trouble winning in a game where there’s not much money on
the table.
But it’s a totally different story in a big game. If I raise it
$3,000 or $4,000 and the other guy and I have a lot of chips on the table,
he’ll be a little more hesitant about raising me now because he
knows there’s a very good chance I’ll play back. The guys
I play with know that when I put my children out there, I don’t
like to let them drown.
But even if I do get reraised in this situation, it’s all right.
In fact, it’s what I want. If he raises me $7,000 or $8,000 and
I’ve got small connecting cards, I’ll call now. If we’ve
both got $250,000 in front of us, then I’m only putting in about
five percent of my money. And it’s worth it, because now I’ve
got a chance to win something if I get a flop. I might be able to break
him.
The Flop
Playing When You Miss Your Hand Completely. If I called in an early position
with small connecting cards and I miss my hand completely, I give the
pot up. I don’t go ahead in that situation with that type of hand.
I just surrender. The first loss is the best loss in a situation like
that. But of course, if I was the raiser, I would go ahead and bet at
the pot. As long as there wasn’t something frightening out there
like the Q? J? 10?, I’m going to bet. And most of the time nothing
frightening will be out there.
If I was rushing and had a 7? 6? in an early position, I’d probably
raise it before the flop. Then, if the A? A? K? flopped, I’d bet
right out. A flop like that wouldn’t frighten me. Why? It’s
simple. My opponents don’t know that I don’t have A-K, A-Q,
K-K, or any hand that would benefit from that flop. They don’t know
what I’ve got. In fact, if I raised in an early position on the
pre-flop, they might think I have a hand with big cards.
If I had raised it from a middle position before the flop, I’d bet,
unless someone bet in front of me. In that case, the pot is his. I’d
know my opponent has something, and when I’ve got nothing with this
kind of hand, I’m usually not going to try to make any great play,
although occasionally I will bluff at it.
If I was a caller before the flop in a middle or late position and it
was checked to me on the flop, I’d check along. As long as I didn’t
make anything, it would probably have to be checked to me twice, on the
flop and fourth street, before I’d make a bet, which would be a
bluff.
Of course, if I had raised it before the flop from a late position, I’d
almost always bet, particularly if it was checked around to me. I’d
bet even if the flop was A? A? K?, as noted before, and it was probable
that one of my opponents had an ace. I’d do it because I don’t
want my opponents to get out of the habit of checking to me. Since I was
the raiser they expect me to bet. So I go ahead and make a courtesy bet
for them. When I make that bet, I’m trying to do two things:
(1) Win the pot right there. And I will many a time because my opponents
get into the habit of throwing their hands away.
(2) Maintain my aggressive image. As long as I do, they’ll continue
to check it to me.
That’s the way I pick up all the pots I do. Of course, if I get
check-raised, I’m out immediately. That’s the risk I take.
But a guy really has to have a hand before he’ll put a play like
that on me. So when he does, I let him have the pot. But they miss their
hands more often than they make them. Because of that, I pick up more
pots than I give up.
Fourth and Fifth Streets
Playing When You Miss Your Hand Completely. If I didn’t improve
on the flop, I wouldn’t be in there on fourth street with small
connected cards unless I was the bettor or the pot was checked to me and
I checked it as well.
If someone had called my bet after having checked it to me on the flop,
I would immediately put him on some kind of hand. If I thought he was
on a drawing hand and it looked like he missed it on fourth, I’d
bet again. If I thought he had a made hand—regardless of how weak
I thought it was, even as weak as the third pair—I wouldn’t
try to make him throw away his hand on fourth if he called me on the flop
and had, therefore, already committed himself to the pot. For example,
say the flop was a K-8-2 and I tried to pick it up but got called. Well,
then I’d try to check it out all the way through. At that point,
I’d be giving up the pot at a minimum loss.
And, once again, if I thought my opponent was on a drawing hand, like
two cards to a straight-flush, and I get check-raised after making another
stab at the pot on fourth, I’m almost always going to give it up.
I’m never going to call a bet when I miss my hand completely, but
in an extreme situation, I might play back at a guy who I think is putting
a play on me. For example, if I was completely convinced a guy was trying
to take the pot away from me, I’d re-play at him. But I’d
have to feel strongly, about it before I’d jeopardize a bunch of
chips in that spot.
My play on fifth street would be just like my play on fourth. If I’m
still betting at the pot, I’d have to continue because it’s
almost impossible for me to win in a showdown. Assuming I didn’t
pair on the end, I’d have only a 7-high. Since I’d put my
opponent on a draw on fourth and that’s why I bet there, I’d
have to feel that he didn’t make it when all the cards were out.
I’d also have to feel very strongly he wouldn’t call my last
bet. Naturally, if I felt like he completed his hand, I’d check.
This is a tough spot on the end, but you just can’t leave all your
money out there without one last stab at the pot. The key to what you’d
do on fifth is very much based on your opinion of why your opponent called
you on fourth. You’d have to feel pretty sure he was drawing, or
you could get yourself in a lot of trouble.
You might find it difficult to continue betting your hand when you know
you don’t have anything. You may think it takes a lot of courage
to do that, and it does. But it’s really just good poker. You’ll
discover, if you use my system of play, that your opponents will be scared
to give you free cards whenever they’ve got a hand, because they
know you might be drawing at an inside straight and betting with it. They
know an aggressive player is liable to show them anything. Consequently,
when they get a hand, they want to shut you out right then. They bet because
they don’t want you in the pot drawing at them.
So there are really two good reasons to play aggressively in this situation:
(1) If your opponents do have a hand, they’ll show you right away.
They don’t want to keep giving you free cards.
(2) Your continuous betting makes them throw away borderline hands so
you can pick up the pot when they don’t have anything.
Quite simply, an aggressive player has by far the best of it.
Playing When You Make Something. I’m now going to discuss how I’d
play small connecting cards when I flop something with them. The hand
I’m going to use as an example throughout this discussion is a 7?
6?. You’ll learn how I’d play when I get:
(1) a poor flop (slightly helpful);
(2) a fair flop (moderately helpful); and
(3) a good flop (very helpful).
Poor Flop
When I’ve got a 7? 6? and a Q? 6? 2? falls, I’d consider that
a poor flop to my hand, and I’d play it similarly to the way I’d
play if I got no help. However, there’s one big difference. Depending
on my opponent and, more importantly, how much money he had on the table,
I’ll gamble with the second pair—a pair of sixes, in this
case—or even the third pair as long as the guy I was up against
was sitting on a lot of checks. I’d do it even if I knew he had
a pair of queens. If I thought I could break him if I caught another 6
or a 7, I’d call a reasonable bet and might even put as much as
10 percent of my money in the pot. I’d surely do it if I thought
I could win a gigantic pot.
I might even raise. I’ll always consider raising, whether I have
caught a small piece of the flop, a pair of sixes in this case, or completely
missed my hand. But that has nothing to do with the value of my hand.
I’d do it because I detected a weakness in somebody or to take advantage
of my position. Another difference in the way I’d play this hand
when I got a little help on the flop and none on fourth or fifth is that
I’d continue to bet on fourth if I was the original raiser. You’ll
recall that even if I missed this hand completely, I’d bet it on
the flop as long as I was the raiser. But if my bet on the flop was called,
I’d try to check it out from then on, unless I thought my opponent
was drawing.
Now that I’ve gotten a little help on the flop, however, I’d
bet again on fourth despite the fact that my bet on the flop was called.
I don’t like to keep betting when I’m on a complete bluff,
but I do like to keep betting when I’ve got an out. In this case,
I know that if I catch that other 6 or a 7, I’d likely have a stronger
hand than my opponent. So I wouldn’t show any weakness with my hand
on fourth street. I’d go ahead and make a reasonable bet.
If I still didn’t get any help on fifth street, I’d probably
stop betting. If my opponent was drawing and he didn’t make his
hand, I’d know that my pair of sixes is more than likely good, so
I’d check. And if they aren’t good, there’s no sense
in losing any more money with them.
If I happen to get some additional help on fourth, such as a 7, well,
then I’d make an oversized bet, one that’s larger than what’s
in the pot. I’m always out to win a big pot, and now I’d have
a hand to do it with. I wouldn’t try to sell my hand for a small
amount of money. I’d make a very big bet on fourth, and a very big
bet on fifth.
If I didn’t catch that 7 until the end, then I might try to sell
it on fifth street for whatever I thought I could get.
Whether I caught the 7 on fourth or fifth, I’d play a hand this
way only if I was the original raiser coming in and I stayed in the lead
by betting on every turn of the cards.
Assuming I was a caller coming in and had checked and called on the flop,
I’d play the hand differently if I caught a 7 on fourth street.
If there was a lot of money in the pot, this is another one of the few
times I’d check-raise. I wouldn’t want to take my opponent,
the original raiser, out of the lead, especially if I know the size of
the pot will make him bet again on fourth and since he’d have no
idea the 7 helped me. He’d surely try to shut me out, and when he
bets, I’d raise him. I’d want to win the pot right there,
because if a queen or deuce comes on the end, the board will pair, killing
my two pair.
If I caught a 6 on fourth street, my strategy would be different still.
The two sixes on the board would look very threatening, so my hand would
be harder to conceal than if I caught a 7. So, even if I had been a caller
up to this point, there’s a good chance I’d take the lead
and bet when the 6 hit. And even though the raiser should see that I might
have three sixes, he might also think I am just representing them. If
you didn’t have a 6 in the hole, this would be a very good opportunity
to bluff at the pot.
Fair Flop
Now I’ll discuss how I’d play that 7? 6? if I got what I’d
call a fair or moderately helpful flop—any three cards that gave
me the top pair, an open-end straight draw, or a flush draw.
I play flush draws extremely slow because they’re so obvious. When
two of the same suit flop, I see so many players who are drawing to a
flush move in on a guy after he bets. Occasionally, I do it too, because
my philosophy is to protect my money and bet whenever I can. But it’s
usually a very obvious play. Most players will put you on a flush draw
in that situation.
For that reason I like a straight draw better, and I play it fast. If
I get that straight draw, well, I’m ready now. I mean, really ready.
The battle is on. If I was the original raiser, of course, I’d bet
on the flop. If I got raised, I’d play back and move all my chips
in. If somebody bet in front of me, I’d raise ‘em.
If I wasn’t the original raiser, I’d check-raise. If the guy
who raised it before the flop bet after I checked, I’d raise with
most or all of my chips. I’d be the aggressor at that point and
nobody would be able to take me out of the lead from then on.
As I said earlier, most decisions are made on the flop. I mean, that’s
where you steal pots. So I’d play my hand this way because this
is a situation where I typically steal a lot of pots. I’d be bluffing
with an out. I could win the pot right there. If I got called, I’d
have a good draw—an open-end straight, which I’d make about
33 percent of the time—and a small chance to backdoor two pair or
trips.
Now, say the flop comes 6-4-2 or 7-4-2, giving me the top pair. In this
case, I’d play it cautiously. I’m not going to fall in love
with that hand, but I’ll gamble a little with it. In other words,
I’d check to the raiser, and then I’d probably call. If I
were in a late position and hadn’t raised originally, I’d
call if somebody bet. But it would be a weak call, meaning that I probably
wouldn’t go any further with the hand if I don’t get any help
on fourth and somebody bets at me again.
One of the reasons I’d call on the flop is that my pair might be
the best hand. Just because the other guy raised it originally doesn’t
mean he has a big pair in the pocket. So there’s a possibility that
I’ve got the best hand right now. I’d learn more from his
play on fourth street. If I didn’t help my hand and he bet again,
I’d get rid of it pretty fast. I wouldn’t invest a lot of
money with that hand without any help.
But the main reason I’d call on the flop is the possibility that
I could win a big pot if I improve my hand and beat a strong hand, such
as two aces or two kings. And I check rather than bet because I might
have the best hand and I don’t want to get shut out by betting and
being raised. Then, I’d have to throw my hand away. By checking,
I could call a reasonable bet and try to catch a card. If I did improve
on fourth, I’d play it from then on just like if I took a poor flop
but got some help on fourth.
A good or even a great flop to a 7? 6? would be a pair with a straight
or flush draw, two pair, trips, a straight, or a flush—even though
it’s a small one. With any good flop to small connecting cards,
I play the hand as if it is complete, even if it’s not. I’d
lead with the hand in an early position, and I’d raise in a late
position. I’d play the hand to get all my money in the center to
start with.
Even if I flopped a pair with a draw, I’d use the same strategy
since I’d have two chances to win it:
(1) I bet or raise and my opponent throws his hand away; or
(2) I improve and my bet or raise is called.
If you follow my advice here, you’ll be in some jeopardy, even
when you get a very good flop. But you’re almost always in some
jeopardy, so you can’t worry about somebody having the nuts all
the time. If you did, you would never get to play a pot.
For example, if you and your opponent both flopped a flush, yours will
likely be the smaller of the two, and you’d be dead. In hold’em,
there’s no way you can draw out when it’s flush-against-flush,
unless you’re drawing to a straight flush. But assuming you can’t
get a straight flush, you’ll just have to lose your money, because
you’ll almost always have to pay your opponent off. It’s one
of the hazards of the game.
You could also flop the ignorant or low end of the straight. But this
is also hazardous, since your opponent could turn a bigger straight. And
again, if your opponent bet anything within reason, you’ll have
to go ahead and pay him. For example, if the flop was a 10-9-8 and somebody
moved all-in on you, you’d be down to judgment. You’d have
to know your opponent, and a lot would depend on how much is in the pot
and the amount he sets you in for. If you’ve got $1,000 in the pot
and he bets you $50,000 more, well, perhaps, you wouldn’t go for
it and you’d throw your hand away. But if you’ve got $1,000
in the pot and he bets you $2,000 more—all your money, or all his
money—then you’d surely pay it off. If you’re beat,
you’re beat. That happens a lot, by the way. And it’s why
hands like K-9 and J-7 are considered trash and shouldn’t be played
in a normal ante ring game.
Good Flop
If I’ve caught good on the flop, I’ll already be committed
to the pot, so I’ll bet on fourth street, as long as I am first
or it is checked to me. But as always, there are exceptions.
For example, if you flopped a diamond flush and another diamond came on
fourth street, your hand would be almost ruined. All you’d have
is a 7-high flush. At that point, you must check your hand and hope to
show it down. If you can’t show it down, you’ve got to throw
it away if there’s any kind of betting.
Or, if you flopped a straight and the board pairs on fourth street, you
could be in trouble. Usually, that shouldn’t stop you because if
a man had flopped a set or two pair, he would’ve raised you. So
if he made a full when the board paired, you’d have to pay him off.
Another hazard.
As you continue to use my system of play, you’ll discover the many
advantages it has. The situation above is a good example. If the flop
came 5-4-3, giving me a straight, my opponent would’ve let me know
on the flop whether or not he had a hand, such as two pair or trips. If
he’s a good player he would, because he wouldn’t want another
card to fall that might be one card off of a straight. He knows if an
ace, deuce, 6, or 7 comes on fourth, he’s going to have to give
the pot up. He knows I’ll bet in that case, even if I don’t
have the one card that’ll make the straight.
For that reason, all good hold’em players do most of their gambling
on the flop, not on fourth and fifth streets. Occasionally, you’ll
see a big pot played after the turn, but in the majority of cases, all
the money goes in on the flop. That’s why the flop is the most crucial
point in the game.
Earlier I stated that it’s quite inconceivable to me that anybody
could get away from their hand if they flopped a set of trips in a raised
pot. At that point, I was talking about a hidden set, a pair in the pocket
and one on the board. It’s a different matter entirely when the
pair is on the board and I have one of the matching cards in the hole.
I’ve released a lot of sets in a situation like that. For example,
say I have a 7-6 and the flop is 7-7-2. I bet and get called. There aren’t
really very many hands someone can call me with. So it’s easy to
release a set in this case, because when you get a lot of money involved
you know the guy who’s in there with you probably has a 7 also.
This is especially true if he’s the aggressor.
So you have to evaluate your kicker. I mean, what’s it worth? The
conclusion I usually reach is that it’s not worth very much. If
I really think he’s got a 7 then I know the best I could hope for
is a tie. Of course, I’m talking about a good player, and it’s
much more likely he’s got me beat. He’s probably in there
with a 7 and a higher card that he could’ve flopped a straight with,
such as an 8-7, 9-7, or 10-7. Another possibility is that he’s got
a high card, such as an ace or king, that’s suited. He might have
a 7-6, like I do, or a 7-5, the only likely hand I could beat. But it’s
almost inconceivable that he’s in there with a 7-4, 7-3, or 7-2,
although this last one would give him a full.
So when I got down into the hand and I gave him credit for the other 7
because he was showing a whole lot of speed, I couldn’t continue
playing my 7 with a small connecting card. And I’d release that
set quite readily. I’d do it real quick.
When I have a set like that with a different kicker, I make another evaluation.
If my kicker was slightly bigger, say a 9 or 10, I’d probably play
it. If I had a suited ace or king, then I’d definitely go ahead
and play it.
Of course, there are times when I might not release my hand after flopping
a set with that 7-6. For example, say I raised with the hand before the
flop, and everybody checks it to me on the flop. Then I bet, and one of
my opponents plays back (check-raises). In this situation, I might go
ahead with my hand, figuring that the guy is trying to shut me out. It’s
possible that he is playing back with an overpair or some other hand that
he might not have raised me with before the flop.
On the other hand, say I held a 7-6 in late position and had called a
small raise before the flop. Now, if the flop comes 7-7-2, I would not
give the raiser credit for a 7. And I’d probably play my hand real
fast trying to win a big pot.
Whenever there’s a raise before the flop, there’s a chance
you can win a big pot. But in an unraised pot, it’s hard to win
a big one. Previously, I noted that you don’t want to get broke
in a nothing pot. I’m reminding you of that now because you might
be tempted to try and win a big pot when you flop a set with small connecting
cards in an unraised pot. You shouldn’t. If I don’t have anything
in the pot to protect, I never jeopardize very much money without a real
good hand. I don’t go out of my way to win nothing pots.
Another important part of my playing philosophy I want to remind you about
is this: You should constantly be trying to get as much value for your
hand as you can. And the way you do that is by betting. That should be
clear by now. You become a big winner at poker by betting, raising, and
reraising—by playing aggressively. Of course, there are times you
have to play defensively, when an aggressive strategy would be wrong because
it could get you shut out of a pot. But in general, you want to be aggressive.
That means you can’t let every card that hits the board threaten
you. As I said, if you’re always worrying about somebody having
the nuts, you never will get to play a hand. This applies to all the hands
I’ve discussed, but it’s especially meaningful when it comes
to playing small connecting cards when you get a good flop. That’s
what you’re playing them for in the first place. So when you make
something with them, you want to get value for them. So you should always
apply this principle: If you’re going to call, you might as well
bet.
You should do that at all the stages of play, but it’s particularly
important on the end because you’ll get paid off with hands that
aren’t what you thought they were. I mean, there’ll be many
times you’ll put your opponent on a hand completely different than
what he’s got. I’m not Kreskin, and neither are you. You might
think a man is drawing to a flush, but maybe he’s got a pair, just
one pair. He might have been running you down with a lot less than you
thought he had. So, when a flush card hits the board on fifth street,
it may not have helped him at all. I mean, you’ll know he’s
got something when that flush card comes, either the flush you thought
he was drawing at or some other piece of the flop. Or maybe he’s
got two pair and you’ve got a straight. You really don’t know
what he’s got. But you’ve got a good hand with your small
connecting cards, so you’re going to pay it off anyway. Therefore,
you might as well bet.
The only time I make an exception is when the board pairs on the end.
Then I’ll check it, and may or may not call, depending on how I
feel about the situation. But assuming that doesn’t happen, if I’ve
made a real good hand with my small connecting cards, I’d go ahead
and bet.
Although there are times when I might be a little concerned because I
don’t have the nuts, there will also be times when I do have the
nuts. Naturally, in that case, I’ll do whatever I think will get
the most money in the pot. If I thought my opponent had a strong hand,
I’d make a big bet. If I thought he had a weak hand, I’d try
to sell my hand by making a smaller bet. I’ll have to use careful
judgment here, judgment about what I think he’s got.
My decision on how much to bet depends on whether I made my hand early
(on the flop) or late (on the end).
If I made my hand early, I’m not going to try to sell him anything.
I’m going to try to break him.
If I made my hand late and I haven’t been charged a lot of money
to make it—say it was checked on the flop, there was a small bet
on fourth, and I made the nuts on the end—well, then I’m not
going to try to break him because he probably won’t call a big bet.
I’d try to sell my hand for whatever I thought I could get for it.
Those of you who are new to no-limit hold’em may not be able to
appreciate how strongly I feel about the small connecting cards. And those
of you who are experienced players are probably quite surprised. But that’s
where it’s at, in my opinion. You have to use your good judgment
when you play the small connecting cards. When you play them right, they’re
big money makers. And that’s what no-limit hold’em is all
about.
Borderline or Trouble Hands
You should commit to memory the list of trouble hands I list below. I
call them trouble hands because that’s exactly what they are, and
I only play them in borderline situations.
Before I get to the list, it’s important that you realize that
trouble hands aren’t necessarily unplayable if:
(1) They are suited; and
(2) They are dealt to me in a shorthanded game, one with four players
or less. In a later section, I’ll go over why in a shorthanded game,
these trouble hands are actually big hands.
But in a ring game, these are hands you can lose a lot of money with,
so you should play them cautiously. You don’t want to jeopardize
much money with them.
Trouble Hands (only when offsuit)
A-Q A-J
A-10 K-Q
K-J K-10
Q-J Q-10
J-10 9-8
I call these borderline hands because I’d question calling a raise
with them. If they’re suited, I’ll call a raise with them
and take a flop. If they’re not suited and I’m out of position,
I won’t call a raise. By out of position I mean that I’m in
a middle position and a man in an early position came in raising. I’ll
pass these hands in that spot.
If I’m in a late position, the pot’s been raised, and another
man calls, well, then I’ll usually call with them—but, I’ll
hear another bell ringing when I do. This time, that bell will be reminding
me to play my hand with extreme caution, unless I get an excellent flop
to it.
The reason why you have to be so careful with every one of those hands
is that you might be up against a hand where you’d be almost dead.
Most players consider A-A, K-K, or A-K to be the best raising hands, so
there’s a good possibility the raiser has one of those three hands.
True, you can’t always assume that, but it’s always in the
back of your mind. So, if you’ve got A-Q, A-J, or A-10, and you’re
up against A-A, K-K, or A-K, you’ve got a terrible hand.
It’s extremely hard to win a big pot with these hands when you’ve
called a raise. They’re definitely trouble hands. You’re much
more likely to lose a big pot with them than you are to win a big pot.
Even when I make a pair with them on the flop, I play them extremely cautiously,
or about the same way I’d play a pair of aces or kings in the pocket.
For example, if I played a K-Q offsuit and the board came
K-4-2, I’d be in a lot of trouble if the raiser’s got one
of the three big hands I think he might have. He’d have two aces,
three kings, or a pair of kings, like me, but he’d also have an
ace kicker.
Or, if I played a 9-8 and the flop was Q-J-10, I still wouldn’t
be too excited about my hand. Although I flopped a straight, it’s
the ignorant end of the straight. In addition, it is vulnerable to the
high end of the straight, which would be made up by a very strong hand
that everybody plays, A-K.
Something else you have to think about with the trouble hands is that
when you flop a straight draw, it’s not as easy to pick up pots
with them as it is with other, stronger hands. You’ll remember that
when I flop a straight draw with small connecting cards, I play my hand
real fast because I have two shots to win the pot. I can win the pot right
on the flop because with small cards out there, it’s less likely
anyone else flopped a hand. And, if I do get called, I’ve still
got a second shot to win it if I make my straight.
But let’s say I’m holding K-Q and the flop comes J-10-5, giving
me a straight draw. It’s highly likely somebody else caught a piece
of that flop as well, and I’ll be less likely to pick the pot up
if I bet. So I don’t have two shots to win it anymore.
The same line of reasoning applies if you are holding K-Q and the flop
comes Q-J-10, giving you the top pair and a straight draw. It’s
still not a good hand because if somebody has an A-K, the best you could
be drawing for is a split.
Even when you flop a very good hand like two pair or trips, you could
be in jeopardy. If the flop was K-K-2 to your K-Q, you could once again
be in big trouble if someone’s got A-K. The difference here is that
you probably won’t be able to get away from your hand and you’ll
have to go ahead and lose a lot of money.
The important point to remember about the trouble hands is when you do
get a flop to them you don’t want to get heavily involved. Just
try to play the pot as cheaply as possible.
A minor exception to the above rule is when you flop a straight, as would
happen if you are holding Q-10 and the flop is K-J-9 or J-9-8, for example.
However, even when you have the nuts, as in this case, there’s a
chance you could lose the pot. If a queen fell on fourth, with the K-J-9
flop, you could lose to an
A-10. And with the J-9-8 flop, you could lose to a K-10. So, you’re
not completely safe with some of these hands even when you flop the nuts.
For the most part, trouble hands, suited or offsuit, should be played
the same way: slowly. However, trouble hands suited are much stronger
hands than trouble hands offsuit, and if you flop a flush or a flush draw
with a suited trouble hand, you can show some speed. For example, if you
had the K? Q? and the flop was 10? 7? 2?, you’d have a real big
hand. Not only would you have a flush draw, but you’d also have
two overcards. Or, if you had the 9? 8? with the same flop, you’d
have a straight and a flush draw. Either situation would present a good
opportunity to check-raise somebody if you were in an early position.
If you were in a late position and somebody led into you, you could raise
them. At that point, you’re be back having two shots to pick up
the pot. You might win it right there, or if you get called, you’d
have a good hand to fall back on.
Trash Hands
With the exception of an ace or a king with any suited card, I consider
any hand I haven’t already discussed to be a trash hand. I put A?
8? and K? 4? in the same category as the small connecting cards and I
play them approximately the same way. For example, if the flop was 9?
6? 2? and I had the A? 8?, I’d have a flush draw and an overcard.
If I was in the pot against two queens, I’d be about even money
to win it. So I’d play my hand like I would if I had two small connecting
cards that were suited, say the 9? 8?. That is, I’d play it fast
and try to win the pot on the flop, because once again, I’d have
two shots to win.
But that’s where I draw the line, with an ace or a king and another
suited card. But when it comes to queens on down, if the two cards don’t
connect, I consider them trash hands—even if they’re suited,
such as Q? 4? or J? 6?.
Hands with non-connecting and offsuit cards such as J? 5?, 10? 3?, 9?
4? are obviously garbage. But so are offsuit hands that a lot of people
play because you can flop a straight with them, such as K-9, Q-8, J-7,
10-6, 9-5, 8-4, 7-3, and 6-2. I don’t play these hands because even
if I got the best flop I could to them—other than a full house—I
could get broke by running into a bigger straight. Consequently, I never
play a hand when I have the top and bottom cards of a straight, except
when I’m in position.
I always make exceptions when I’m in position, even with the trash
hands. For example, if I were on the button with a hand like A-8 offsuit,
I might call a raise before the flop if enough people, say four, were
in the pot in front of me and I didn’t think there’d be any
more raises. I might call a small raise and take a flop with a trash hand
because it’s a good percentage play. I’d be trying to make
a full, trips, or two pair. But if I don’t get a real good flop
to the hand, I’ll throw it away. I won’t get involved and
burn up a bunch of money with one of those trash hands. I’m not
going to call any bets on the flop. I’ll be raising or I’ll
be gone.
If I were in position, I might even raise with a trash hand. More than
that, I might play it fast after the flop, too. Say the guys in the early
positions threw their hands away, and someone in a middle position limped
in. Well, if I were on the button, I’d be in position, and I’d
raise it regardless of what two cards I have. And if it was checked to
me on the flop, I’d bet regardless of what flopped.
Obviously, I wouldn’t be playing my hand because of its value. Trash
hands have no value. I might as well be playing with two blank cards in
this situation because all I’m doing is playing my position and
my opponent. Since he limped in, I’d assume that he’s got
a weak hand to begin with, and if he misses the flop, I’ll be able
to pick the pot up.
Other than the exceptional situations discussed above, trash hands are
just not playable.
SHORTHANDED PLAY
A lot of times, you’ll be playing in a full or ring game, and before
the night is over, you’ll find yourself playing shorthanded. As
I already mentioned, you have to be able to change gears in this situation.
You should play in the same basic style—aggressive—but you
should realize that all the hands increase in value. This is particularly
true of the big cards. And, in a shorthanded game, all the trouble hands
become playable from almost any position.
In a shorthanded game, position is probably the most important thing.
The reason is that you get to look at more cards and have to play more
hands than you would in a ring game. You play your position more than
your cards in a shorthanded game.
For example, when your game gets down to four-handed play, you need a
better hand in the first two positions than you need in the last two.
When you raise on the button, the other man has to act first, and that
puts him at a big disadvantage. When the other man has to act on his hand
first, it’s a great equalizer.
So in a shorthanded game you’d play your position using the same
theories you would in a full game, but keep in mind that the values of
the hands go up a few notches. The trouble hands become better hands because
you don’t figure to be up against A-A, K-K, or A-K nearly as often
as you might in a ring game.
You play more like you would with big cards. In a shorthanded game, the
bigger your cards are, the better hand you’ll have. For instance,
in a ring game, you might play two aces or two kings a lot slower after
the flop because there could be a lot of people taking a flop to beat
those big pairs. Whereas in a shorthanded game, two aces or two kings
is a mountain of a hand and you can play them real fast after the flop.
Consequently, these big pairs are much more valuable hands than they are
in a ring game. What you’re trying to catch in a shorthanded game
is big cards in position.
INSURANCE
The practice of taking insurance is not as common today as when I wrote
the original Super/System, however you still see it sometimes, and you
should have a general idea of what deals are profitable.
Many times when you’re playing no-limit hold’em a player will
have all his money in the pot before the flop, on the flop, or even on
fourth street. Since there are still cards to come and since no more betting
can take place (if it’s a head-up situation), both players will
generally turn their hands over so that insurance can be considered. I
say generally, because there is no rule that says you must turn your hand
over, but such a request is rarely, if ever, refused.
Insurance is a side bet that’s usually made between the two players
involved in the pot or between one of the players involved and an insurance
man who may or may not be an active player. The player with the hand that
has the best potential to win the pot is offered or asks for some insurance
as a way to protect his investment in the pot. But unless a mistake is
made, it’s always a bad bet. As it is in life away from the poker
table, the insurance man won’t be giving away anything. When he
lays you a price on your hand, he’ll be getting the best of it.
The price you’ll be getting will always be considerably less than
the true price your hand is worth. The difference between the true value
of your hand and the actual price the insurance man is willing to lay
is his vigorish, also known as his edge or commission. I use the phrase
“best potential to win the pot” because the best hand on the
flop doesn’t always have the best winning potential. For example,
if the flop was 7? 5? 4? and you had the 7? 6?, you’d be about a
2 to 1 favorite over an opponent with a pair of kings, say, the K? K?.
There are twenty cards in the deck that could win for you with two shots
to catch any one of them. Your straight-flush draw gives you fifteen wins,
and the three sixes and two sevens that are still in the deck give you
five more wins. Of course, the assumption here is that your opponent’s
hand doesn’t improve.
Through the years, I’ve heard a lot of discussion about whether
you should or shouldn’t take insurance. My advice is to lay the
insurance, but don’t take it because the best potential hand always
has to take the worst of it. For example, if you’re a 3 to 2 favorite,
the best you can usually get is 13 to 10 or maybe 7 to 5. So why take
it? That’s the advantage you’re looking for to start with.
If you take insurance, you’re giving up your advantage. You can’t
argue with mathematical facts when you have the best of something. If
you can lay 7 to 5 on a 3 to 2 shot, you should do it. But you shouldn’t
take 7 to 5 when you’re a 3 to 2 favorite. However, I can understand
if a man on a short bankroll considers taking insurance. I guess it would
be okay to take the worst of it so you could stay in action. But if your
bankroll allows, don’t take insurance—lay it.
I used to talk about a related subject with a very big and successful
gambler I’ve known for many years. He said, “If a man came
in and offered to lay me 10 to 1 on the flip of a coin for all the money
I had in the world, I wouldn’t take it.” He said he just couldn’t
liquidate everything he’s got, all of his property and his cash.
He wouldn’t risk losing it all, which would be worth several million
dollars. He wouldn’t do it even if he thought he could get hold
of a few more million.
But I’d do it. I surely would. I’d just have to. I couldn’t
pass up the opportunity to take 10 to 1 on an even money shot. I’d
do it because I have enough confidence in myself that I’d be able
to come up with more millions if I lost.
A FINAL WORD
Of course, I’m sure you understand that all the numerous possibilities
have by no means been exhausted. No-limit Texas hold’em is a highly
complex game. It’s hardly possible and certainly not practical to
attempt to discuss the enormous variety of situations that could occur.
And as you now know, there are certain questions I wouldn’t be able
to answer definitively because many times, even I don’t know exactly
what I’d do until I’m faced with the problem. Regardless of
what other books or other players teach, there is no magical formula for
how to play poker. As I’ve said, at such times, I go with my feeling,
which is really a rapid analysis of conscious and subconscious thoughts.
Nevertheless, I’ve given you a lot of white meat, sophisticated
techniques and strategies that are known only to a few world-class poker
players. The average player has never had access to the kind of information
you’ve just read. First of all, nothing as comprehensive as this
has ever been written about no-limit hold’em. Even if it were, unless
it was written by someone who has played and consistently won at a world-class
level for many years, it would not be worth much. In fact, it could even
be harmful. Having no information at all is better than having bad information.
You should do quite well at no-limit hold’em now that you know almost
as much about the game as I do. The rest is up to you.
HOLD’EM SUPPLEMENT
The following tables are contributed by Richard Englesteen.
DOUBLE BELLY-BUSTER STRAIGHTS
There is a fourteen-card straight continuum since aces may be used in
a big or little straight.
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 J Q K A
CHARTS 623 - 627
COLORFUL NAMES OF
VARIOUS HOLD’EM HANDS
A-A.........................................................................American
Airlines
A-K..........................................................................................Big
Slick
A-Q.............................................................................Doyle
Brunson*
A-J..................................................................................................Ajax
A-10..................................................................................Johnny
Moss
A-8...........................................................................Dead
Man’s Hand
3-A.................................................................Baskin-Robbins
K-Q............................................................................Marriage
K-J.....................................................................................Kojak
K-9.................................................................................Canine
K-8...............................................................................Kokomo
K-7..............................................................................Columbia
River
K-3........................................................................................King
Crab
Q-J......................................................................................Maverick
Q´-J©..................................................................................Pinochle
Q-10...................................................................................Goolsby
Q-9....................................................................................Quinine
Q-7.............................................................................Computer
Hand
J-6..................................................................................Railroad
Hand
J-5....................................................................................Motown
5-10..............................................................................Woolworth
10-4......................................................................Broderick
Crawford
10-3..................................................................................Weinberg
10-2.............................................................................Doyle
Brunson*
9-8.....................................................................................Oldsmobile
6-9....................................................................................Joe
Bernstein
3-9........................................................................................Jack
Benny
2-9.........................................................................................Twiggy
8-8............................................................................Little
Oldsmobile
8-5.......................................................................................Finky
Dink
3-8...................................................................................Raquel
Welch
7-6..........................................................................................Union
Oil
5-7........................................................................................Pickle
Man
7-2........................................................................................Beer
Hand
6-3.........................................................................................Blocky
6-2...................................................................................Ainsworth
4-5.......................................................................................Jesse
James
3-5...................................................................................Bully
Johnson
2-4........................................................................Lumberman’s
Hand
3-3...............................................................................................Crabs
6-6-6.......................................................................................Kotch
4-4-4....................................................................................Grand
Jury
*The reason there are two hands named after me is because of what happened
in the 1976 and 1977 World Series of Poker. In both years, I won with
a 10-2. The A-Q has long been called “Doyle Brunson” in Texas
because I try never to play this hand.
|